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This research provides a study about the changing interaction of a Treaty Organization
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NATO was founded in 1949 as an organization which formed an integrated
defense against potential Soviet threats in Europe. This was seen as a clear and
present danger that vitally affected the interests of the U.S. and Canada, as well
as the nations of Western Europe.
After World War II, Soviet's territorial demands over Turkey, also forced
Turkey to seek a reliable security policy. At this time, Turkish leaders saw NATO
as the best alternative. In 1952, Turkey became a NATO member and this decision
has shaped Turkey's security policy ever since.
The formation of the NATO Alliance created an unprecedented degree of
peace time political cooperation among its members that helped deter Soviet efforts
to divide and weaken the Western nations. While NATO's military strength has
grown enormously over the past 40 years, so has that of the Warsaw Pact. From the
outset, it was recognized that NATO required not only military strength but political
cohesion if it was to resist the pressures from the East to divide and weaken its
members. As a result, there has been a continuing effort to achieve agreement and
to state a common position on major issues affecting Alliance security. Between
1945-1991, there wasn't any war in Europe and this was a success for NATO.
During the past forty years, Turkey, a small power which has to exist alongside
a global power—Soviet Union, was in control of the strategic Turkish Straits and
thereby in a geographical position to hold a great power "by the throat," as Stalin put
it.
1 Turkey's formal association with U.S. automatically increased the risk of
involvement in an East-West confrontation. On the other hand, cancellation of that
association would not automatically eliminate the risk for Turkey. When we look at
the past events, we can see that Turkey, with the second largest armed forces in
NATO, was evaluated as sometimes a good ally, but sometimes she was a forgotten
ally.
From the vantage point of 1992, we can see that many things have changed in
the past forty years. Especially after Gorbachev became the president of the
U.S.S.R., significant developments occurred in Warsaw Pact countries. At the end
of 1991, the U.S.S.R was dissolved. Old Soviet Republics declared their
independence. There are many attempts towards democracy in ex-Warsaw Pact
countries and new independent countries. These developments lessened the tensions
between East and West, and seemed to reduce the risk of war in Europe.
However, regional conflicts all over the world, such as Middle East, Balkans,
Central and Southeast Asia, are threatening the world peace. These events have
important effects on current world politics. All countries are making their military,
1
Vali, Ferenc A., The Turkish Straits and NATO, 1972.
economical and political decisions and preferences accordingly; and these decisions
and preferences will determine the "New World Order."
Therefore, NATO as an organization and each NATO member must seek new
arrangements and policies, because NATO's and members' own policies must be
adjusted to new developments. So, while NATO is dealing with its internal problems,
it also determines new strategies which will be suitable for itself and its members'
own securities. Western NATO members, which are also European Community
members, are looking for a new integration in Europe that will include the defense
of Europe. They are not eager to follow the U.S. lead. They perceive their interest
differently on issues such as detente, Southeast and Central Asia, Eastern Europe,
Balkans and Middle East.
Turkey, as a NATO member and as a country which lies between Asia and
Europe, between the Muslim Middle East and Christian West, between the ex-Soviet
Union and so-called free-world, must adjust her security policy to the new
environment. Turkey's geopolitical position, is very close to the potential regional
conflicts which seem likely to occur in the Middle East, Central Asia, or Balkans.
Hence, she may serve as a buffer or a bridge among a number of contemporary
power centers. Moreover, this area has been of the central importance throughout
recorded history and has been the central scene of almost continuous cross cultural
communication and conflict. This is another point that makes Turkey important in
world politics.
On the other hand, the domestic situation in Turkey is very different from the
situation in 1950s, when the defense ties with the West were established. Needs,
values and opinions have diversified and multiplied. The socio-economic demands
of a politically emancipated population that has enjoyed democracy almost
consistently for more than four decades have made development its primary goals.
This has led to defense having to compete with other requirements for its allocation
of national resources. All these developments make the security question tough for
Turkey. Turkish leadership must take into account many internal and external factors
to make the appropriate decision.
B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As we see, new political, economical and military environments require new
strategies for NATO and Turkey. Both NATO and its member countries must
evaluate the old policies and determine new advantages, disadvantages, threats and
opportunities, because it is not clear that old strategies are suitable to new
environment.
Therefore, in the following pages of this study, the primary research question
will be the following: as a result of these changing political, economical and military
environments, how would the leadership of Turkey decide whether Turkey should
stay in NATO or not?
To address this question, some subsidiary questions must first be addressed.
The followings are these subsidiary questions :
• Why did Turkey join NATO?
• How did the membership of Turkey affect Turkey and NATO?
• When we look at the current environment, where does the primary threat to
Turkey come from now?
• Is it also the same for NATO?
• When we consider all these developments and other available security policies,
is it still advantageous for Turkey to be a NATO member?
C. METHODOLOGY
The primary source material will consist of literature reviews to answer these
questions. The literature reviews include reports, articles in magazines and
newspapers and books published about the relevant topics.
Using these literature reviews, I analyzed the political, economical and military
environment in 1950s and examined why Turkey joined NATO. After this I made a
comparison with the current environment. Finally I explored how the new security
policy must be determined and which alternatives can be selected.
To do this, since Turkey's entry to NATO was a strategic decision, I use the
principles of strategy evaluation. 2 So the four principles, Consistency, Consonance,
Advantage, and Feasibility will be applied to the Turkey-NATO relations in order to
find out whether Turkey should stay in NATO or not. Figure 1 will be our frame in
this analysis.
2 Mintzberg, Henry, and Quinn, James B., The Strategy Process (Concepts,
Contexts, Cases), 1991.
II. WHY DID TURKEY JOIN NATO?
Turkey's entry to NATO was a strategic decision and at that time it was a
suitable strategy for Turkey, according to the Turkish leaders who made this
decision. It is better to analyze this situation in a historical perspective and identify
the opportunities and risks in Turkey's environment during this period to answer the
question, "What brought Turkey into alliance with West," or, "Why did Turkey join
NATO?"
A. BEFORE 1945
Neutralism was the major feature of Turkish foreign policy in the formative
years of the 1920s and 1930s. Though never systematically defined, it implied a
commitment to correct diplomatic relations with European powers, non-involvement
in the affairs of Europe, friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., and peaceful relations
with other neighbors.
At the root of this attitude lay the experience of the War of Independence
between 1919-22, which was formative for foreign policy. This was not simply a
struggle against territorial occupation and dismemberment by Britain, France, Italy
and Greece; politically and economically, it had an anti-imperialist thrust. From the
organizational change perspective, it was the result of the interactions between an
organization (Turkish State) and its environment. The environment of an
organization is the pattern of all the external conditions and influences that affect
its life and development. The environmental influences can be technological,
economic, physical, social, military, and political. And organizations interact with
and/or react against these influences. This is why Turkey preferred neutralism during
this period.
As a result, distance and reserve continued to dominate Turkish relations with
the West for many years, while the anti-imperialist nature of Leninist foreign policy
and Soviet support for the War of Independence contributed to the maintenance of
warmer relations with the Soviet Union.
Turkey's internal situation also affects its strategic decisions. After the Treaty
of Lausanne in 1923, you see Turkey as a country which was small, economically
weak, and militarily exhausted. So the leadership of Turkey gave the priority to
internal reconstruction, including Ataturk's radical social reforms. This has required
a quiet foreign policy that excluded alliances and external commitments of any kind,
hence the choice of neutrality.
But Turkish leaders were aware of a risk which would stem from the
neutralism, namely "isolation." To avoid isolation, Turkey improved diplomatic
relations with all major powers and gave particular attention to the need to build
friendly relations with neighbors. For example, there was a period of friendship
between Turkey and Greece during the Ataturk and Venizelos leaderships.
Relations with the Soviet Union occupied a special place. The Treaty of
Neutrality and Non-Aggression in 1925, and the assurance of Soviet friendship,
though it lost some of its original glow in the late 1930s, was one of the main planks
of Turkish foreign policy. For example, the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936,
came about largely because the Soviet Union supported Turkey's request for an
international conference on the Straits. Turkey also accepted Soviet technical and
economic assistance in the 1930s, in marked contrast to her general reluctance to
accept foreign assistance from European powers.
This special relationship was a unique development, considering the history of
suspicion and war between Russia and Ottoman Empire. However, during this
period, the U.S.S.R.'s contractual obligations and generally friendly relations between
the two countries reassured Turkey that there would be no reversion to the Czarist
policy of expansion at her expense. Her major military antagonist of the past two
centuries began to shed its traditional image.
Departures from Turkish neutralism occurred in the late 1930s and led to a
cooling of Soviet relations. Not only had the success of modernization along Western
lines strengthened the power of the political and economic elite who feared
Communism and tended to favor a pro-Western foreign policy, but the external
environment looked more threatening because of the rise of Mussolini and Hitler.
Her self-imposed isolation from European affairs became difficult to sustain in the
face of the rising interest of Mussolini in the Mediterranean and Hitler in the
Balkans.
This changing and threatening environment led Turkey to make new friends in
international arena. Turkey concluded a Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain which
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was ratified in October 1939, after the disclosure of the German-Soviet Non-
Aggression Treaty of August of 1939. Soviet foreign policy seemed concerned to
accommodate Germany, and Turkish-Soviet relations went through their coldest
stage in twenty years. It seemed that Soviet's foreign policy was also affected from
her internal situation. She seemed to solve her internal problems stemming from the
1917 revolution, and to try to gain power by way of some non-aggression agreements.
Before the World War II, the United States was another big country in
international arena. But as a general rule, the U.S. considered Turkey to lie in the
British sphere of interests. So, the U.S. wasn't really concerned with Turkey until the
end of the World War II. 3
As we see, before the World War II, Turkey had followed generally a flexible
and cautious policy of balanced power and neutralism fitting the needs of a new state
in search of internal reform and regime consolidation. The formula was simple and
became a major principle of Ataturk's policies, "...peace at home and peace in the
world." Translated to practical policies, this meant the cultivation of friendly relations
with important neighboring states in the Balkan peninsula; rapprochement and
friendship with the newly born Soviet revolutionary regime; and resumption of
friendly relations with Germany, which could also serve to balance and ameliorate
the relationship of Turkey with the traditional mobile power in Mediterranean, Great
Britain.
3
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
Turkey had managed to retain its neutrality throughout World War II, walking
the diplomatic tightrope between the Scylla of German military control of continental
Europe and the Balkans and the Charybdis of British naval primacy in the
Mediterranean. 4 And this policy prevented the destruction of Turkey.
B. AFTER 1945
The outcome of World War II drastically changed the picture in the world.
Prior to war, the U.S. and Soviet Union were two big countries amidst several large
powers. In the post war era, we see that these two countries "Super Powers", amidst
a world of exhausted lesser powers. While the U.S., for its part, was still vacillating
between isolationism and involvement, the Soviet Union, emerging victorious, showed
definite expansionist tendencies in its attempt to create a cordon-sanitaire in its
Eastern European "soft underbelly". 5 Germany was defeated soundly and divided
into East and West sectors. Britain, also a victorious nation, had, nonetheless, been
dealt a severe body blow by the war.
Actually, moving with their prewar Great Power momentum, it was Churchill
and Stalin who haggled initially over the details of the post war geopolitical map in
Europe. In a series of formal and informal exchanges between November 1943 and
July 1945 (Tehran, Moscow, Yalta, Potsdam), the two leaders sought to divide
4 Weber, Frank, The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a
Turkish Alliance in the Second World War, 1979.
5 Couloumbis, Theodore, The U.S., Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle,
1983.
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Europe into spheres of influence. But this situation was not to last long, for one of
the central by products of World War II was the center of gravity of global power
moved away from the center of European continent and toward peripheral powers
that had played lesser roles in the 19th century-the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
World War II caused Europe to be destroyed. Western European countries
were in need of political, economic and military aid. Soviet regime was a threat to
these countries. Since the Eastern European countries were under the influence of
this regime, the other super power, the U.S. felt that she has to protect Western
Europe against the Soviet expansionism. This was necessary to protect both the U.S.
and Western Europe's interests. The U.S. government formulated and coordinated
a strategy for the defense of Western Europe. According to this strategy, the U.S.
would provide for the necessary military equipments, and West European countries
would transfer their resources to their economic developments rather than investing
in military. In other words, the U.S. would support these countries in political,
economic and military area.
These developments were the beginning of "cold war" and "loose bipolar
system" in international relations due to the different ideologies of two super power.
Even though Turkey managed to remain neutral until the closing days of war,
in spite of the pressures of fighting countries, post war era situation in Turkey was
not different than in Western Europe. Turkey's economy, despite structural
11
imbalances, did not seem faced with immediate crisis.6 But her growth rate was zero
and needed foreign support for her economic developments.
During the war, Turkey amassed a reserve of some $270 million in gold and
foreign exchange, though at the price of running down its already inadequate
industry. This amount was sufficient to defray the costs of imports for more than a
year; in the meantime most foreign observers expected Turkish exports to Europe
to rise rapidly. Moreover, the new Turkish government had, in September 1946,
undertaken a substantial devaluation to bring the value of its currency into line with
the views of the International Monetary Fund. Economic liberalization became the
order of the day; a strong current began to flow against the hostility to private
enterprise that had characterized the previous decade.
Essentially this movement represented a reaction against the failure of the
earlier experiment to provide a self-sufficient economic base and the restiveness of
Turkey's growing entrepreneurs with wartime restrictions. The sudden relaxation of
controls afforded momentary relief to business interests, and provided the possibility
of windfall profits as well, giving to the Turkish authorities and Western observers
an initial if short-lived surge of confidence. Although these measures soon proved
to be the wrong prescription for healthy development, at the end of 1946 Turkey's
economic prognosis appeared satisfactory.
USFR, 1946.
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Turkey's domestic political situation was also different than its pre-war
situation. During this period, Turkey was experiencing a multi-party system and there
were attempts to complete her democratic institutionalization. But she needed
external support in these endeavors. Of course only democratic countries, such as
U.S and Western European countries, could provide this kind of support.
At this time, Turkish Armed Forces was not effective. This was one of the
reasons that led Turkish leaders not to involve in the war. Since the end of the war
the Turkish Armed Forces had remained woefully antiquated, some of their
munitions dating from the First World War. They lacked mobility; even the
advantage of interior lines of communication was largely offset by the poor state of
the transportation network. Turkish officials were looking for solutions to bring up
the Turkish Armed Forces "up to strength".
While Turkey had hard times with her internal affairs, the external conditions
were also worsening. In addition to internal and external developments explained
above, when Soviet victories over Germany established and the U.S.S.R. emerged as
unchallenged power in Eastern Europe, the Turkish suspicion had turned to fear.
Actually, the core issue was evident even in 1939. Conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact
of 1939, gave concrete evidence that the Kremlin had not abandoned the traditional
Russian ambition to control the Turkish Straits.
It was at this time of shifting power and uncertainty of transition at the regional
and global settings that the Soviets raised a number of revisionist demands with
respect to the status of the straits and Turkey's eastern provinces of Kars and
13
Ardahan bordering on the Soviet Union. By 1945 it had become quite clear to
Turkish officials that the Soviet objective was to revise the regime of the Straits in
favor of Soviet interests—specifically moving away from exclusive Turkish sovereignty
to an arrangement of joint Soviet-Turkish control responsibilities over the Straits.
The first Soviet move to test the Turkish issue came on March 19, 1945, when
Molotov gave notice of Soviet intention to denounce the 1925 Treaty of Friendship
and Non-Aggression with Turkey. On June 7, 1945, the Kremlin has advanced
another demand, far more alarming than the first. Now, Moscow was demanding a
base on the Straits, and a border rectifications in the eastern part of Turkey, as the
price of renewing the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. This prospect surely
sent shivers and chills down the Turkish spine. In reaction, the Turkish diplomatic
machine was cranked into higher gear. 7
As can be seen, on the following days of World War II, when we consider the
external and internal affairs, Turkey has faced three crucial developments which
would determine her future policies:
• Soviet's territorial demands
• The necessity of foreign aid for economic development
• The need of external support in establishing the multi-party system and
democratic institutions.
7 Howard, Harry, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1975.
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C. TURKISH EFFORTS TO INVOLVE THE U.S.
According the Turkish leaders, Soviet threat was the most important problem
which was directly related with her security and independence. So, they began to look
for the solutions. It became obvious to the Turkish leaders that the British were
overextended and tiring fast and that the U.S. had to replace them in the traditional
role of mobile global balancer.
Therefore, the Turkish objective became one of securing peacetime U.S.
military and diplomatic support for Turkish territorial integrity and the maintenance
of the status quo in the Straits. Turkey's geopolitical position was the most important
factor that could help Turkey to get the Western support. The U.S. obliged,
cautiously at first and enthusiastically later. Sharing Ankara's argument that Turkey's
geographic location rendered it a key to the Middle East, the Truman administration
demonstrated its backing by dispatching the powerful battleship USS Missouri on a
show the flag mission to Istanbul on April 5,1946.
For the Turks, the image of the U.S. was greatly enhanced by the American
performance in the war. Capping it off was the explosion of the atomic bomb, which
imparted to the U.S. an aura of invincibility that would not be questioned in Turkey
for many years to come. Moreover, the victory of the Allied cause was widely
regarded by the Turkish elite as a measure of the superiority of the democratic
15
system. At the same time, the U.S. was generally depicted by the Turkish press as
the defender of right, justice, and humanity.8
These images, opportunities, and risks led Turkish leaders to put into effect the
efforts to involve the U.S. The Ankara government was successful in its efforts. For
example, to cope with the Soviet's territorial demands, the Turkish government
stepped up its consultations with the U.S., attempting to dramatize the Soviet threat,
arguing that the Kremlin would be deterred not by concessions but by firmness. So,
to reinforce her position in the face of these threading gestures, the Ankara
government sought urgently to coordinate its response with those of the U.S. and
British governments. The firmness which Washington and London joined the Ankara
government in treating the Soviet threats showed its effect after a while.
In the face of tangible diplomatic support from Britain and the U.S., the Soviet
Union called off its diplomatic offensive by the end of 1946, and the pressure on




When we look at the world politics, we see that Turkey and Greece sometimes
had the same problems, and so they have dealt with the same issues at the same
time. In the spring of 1947, Greece and Turkey were in quite different circumstances.
8




While Turkey was dealing with the problems explained above, the Greek government
was in the midst of a stubborn civil war; and its major external supporter, Great
Britain, was about to shut off the life-support mechanism. 10 For the politicians in
Athens, Western support was not a question of choice, but an imperative for political
survival.
Shortly after the British formally informed the U.S. government that they could
no longer foot the bill of $250 million in economic and military support needed to
maintain the non-Communist status quo in Greece and Turkey, the U.S. decision
making apparatus responded with the historic proclamation of the Truman Doctrine
on March 12, 1947.
According to the U.S. officials, the communist rebellion in Greece would prove
successful without massive American intervention to check it. This, in turn, was
expected to place Greece into the Soviet orbit, leading to isolation, encirclement, and
potential loss of Turkey for the West. 11
America's actions to aid and abet the governments of Turkey and Greece were
projected as a demonstration of vigilance and resolve in a deadly game of global
significance. Turkey and Greece became the demonstration vehicles of America's
determination to confront the rise of communism, equated with Soviet expansionism,
in any part of the globe beyond the Soviet sphere of influence. The need for





declaring a doctrine of resolve to contain the Soviet Union was dramatized by the
Greek civil war, which was fast tilting in favor of the Communist guerrillas. Turkey
was not considered to be on the danger list. But in the words of a U.S official,
Turkey "...was slipped into the oven with Greece because that seemed the surest way
to cook a tough bird." 12
In tangible terms, U.S. military and economic aid soon became the primary
lever of U.S. presence and influence in Turkey and Greece. Congress initially
authorized $400 million for aid to both countries. 13
The international arena is an open system. States and international
organizations are the members of this system. Each of them can be affected by the
others' decisions and actions. In these relations, economics have an important place.
Economic relations can be used to have a political effect on the other members of
the system. So, Turkish leaders, being conscious through their history to the pain of
offering special privileges to foreigners (for example, the capitulations during the
Ottoman Empire), were very sensitive to the implementation of Truman Doctrine.
And they insisted that U.S. journalists monitoring aid to projects would be limited
in their movements by requirements of Turkey's national security considerations. 14
12
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
13 U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants, and Assistance from International Organizations, yearly publications.
14
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
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In the meantime, the U.S. was undertaking a massive rehabilitation program
for Europe under the Marshall Plan. Proclamation of the Marshall Plan in June,
1947, faced the Ankara government with the urgent problem of discovering how they
might fit into this project. The Marshall Plan was not designed to deal with Turkey's
particular situation. With the Truman Doctrine, American planners believed that
Turkey's urgent assistance requirements had been met. But Turkish officials insisted
on being included in this plan, and the American policy makers proposed only a
small role for the Marshall Plan in Turkey. 15 What they believed for Turkey was an
allocation of machinery to stimulate production in agricultural goods and minerals.
True to the original intent of its designers, the program for Marshall Plan assistance
in Turkey concentrated on developing agriculture. And most Turks greeted the
Marshall Plan with warm appreciation. 16
E. THE CHALLENGE OF NATO
While the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were contributing to the
development of Western Europe, it was, at the same time, a clear signal of Europe
being divided into East and West. The Soviet Union saw the European countries as
an obstacle against the expansion of its ideology throughout the world. During this
period, East Europe was one of the weak points of the Westerns. So the U.S.S.R.
15
Helseth, William, The U.S. and Turkey, 1962.
Robinson, Richard, Impact ofAmerican Military and Economic
Assistance Programs in Turkey, 1956.
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increased its influences on these countries. To prevent the expansion of the Soviet
ideology, the U.S. coordinated the "Containment Strategy" under the names of the
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. According to these plans, freedom of people
and independence of the countries will be defended with the military power, if
necessary.
By mid- 1948 the U.S. had become interested in establishing a formal collective
security arrangement for Europe. This was a momentous shift in American policy.
Up to this time she had contributed to improve the military power of Western
European countries by providing economic aid and military equipment, but the U.S.
government had on a number of occasions rejected the idea of engaging in an
explicit defensive alliance.
But with the demise of the non-Communist regime in Czechoslovakia and the
imposition of the Berlin blockade in 1948, the U.S. stance toward defensive pacts
shifted. 17 In March 1948, when England, France, Belgium, Holland, and
Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact for collective defense, the United States
announced its support of this arrangement,and by June of that year the U.S. was
actively engaged in laying the bases for the NATO.
Finally, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance originally
envisaged as restricted exclusively to Western European states, officially came into
being in April 1949. NATO members have agreed to coordinate their defense
17
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
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planning in peacetime and to assist each other in defending their territory if any
member should be attacked. The heart of the treaty is Article V, which declares that
an attack on one member will be met by response from all members. 18
The Ankara governmentwas immediately interested in joining the organization.
Because, the Turkish leaders were animated by concern lest Turkey's exclusion lead
to a diminution of U.S. interest and consequently to a reduction in American aid
which was provided by Truman Doctrine and Marshal Plan. Unquestionably, the size
of U.S. assistance had by this time become a central preoccupation in Ankara. Some
Turkish leaders also voiced anxiety that the formation of NATO, by barring further
Soviet encroachment in Western Europe, might induce the Kremlin to increase
pressure on such less firmly protected points as Turkey. 19
On the other hand, Turkey was still dealing to establishing the democratic
institutionalization, and still needed external support to accomplish this attempt.
According to the Turkish leaders and the public opinion, these developments could
be supported only by democratic governments, which are also founders of NATO.
Turkey's big goal, being a modernized country which is be at the same level of
Western civilization, was another factor that led Turkish government to interested
in joining NATO.
Sloss, Leon, NATO Reform: Prospects and Priorities, 1975.
19
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
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The lure of cooperation with a capitalist giant and the desire to be accepted by
the community of Europe have influenced the decision of a generation of officials
and interest groups trained in, Western concepts of modernization. So, to join any
western organization and to follow a policy which is parallel to Western countries,
became an important government objective in Turkey. And generally, the public was
supporting this kind of policy.
All these external developments and domestic pressures forced the Turkish
leaders to follow diplomatic actions to be involved in NATO. At first, the founders
of this organization didn't accept this involvement. The U.S. administration demurred
on the grounds that this pact was an Atlantic regional alignment not open purely
Mediterranean states. Basically, the U.S. was not prepared to undertake further
responsibilities until NATO structure had been firmly established. The opposition
from the European members of the alliance, especially the British and Scandinavians,
formed the greatest barrier to Turkish admission.20
These powers apparently were fearful lest the extension of the pact to non-
industrialized and Muslim Turkey would weaken the unity of the European
community. Some also seemed concerned that the effort to bring Turkey's military
equipment up to the standards set for Europe would entail a reduction in the arms
Armstrong, Hamilton, Eisenhower's Right Flank, 1951.
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they were to receive. These states were also cool to the idea of expanding the NATO
treaty to include such clearly non-Atlantic states such as Turkey and Greece. 21
It was the time of making a strategic decision. The basic point that strategy,
ultimately, requires the achievement of fit between the external situation
(opportunities and threats) and internal capability (strengths and weaknesses) would
be the basis for Turkish leaders. When the Turkish decision makers analyzed the
situation then, explained above, and they came up with the following reasons which
led them to be a NATO member:
• The necessity of military support against the Soviet Union.
• The big goal of being a European country.
• To ensure the continuity of the economic and politic supports provided by the
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.
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• To get the support which is needed for democratic developments.
After this analysis, Turkish leaders began series of diplomatic actions. They tried to
show how Turkey and Western countries will be affected if Turkey is excluded from
NATO. Turkey's strategic position was the most effective factor that Turkish leaders
had. At the same time, the Korean war was a good opportunity for Turkey. The
heroism of five thousand Turkish troops on Korean battlefields and Turkey's
Couloumbis, Theodore, Greek Political Reaction to American and
NATO Influences, 1966.
^lass notes at the Turkish Naval Academy, Turkey-Super Powers Relations,
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dedication to democratic progress during an era of paranoid American sensitivity to
communism endeared Turkey to the American public.
And finally, in the end of these Turkish diplomatic efforts, on May 15, 1951,
Washington proposed to its NATO partners that Turkey and Greece be accepted as
full members. The rationale for this decision as leaked to the press was that the
Turkish armed forces would fill an otherwise exposed flank, and that with such ties
Turkey possibly could be drawn toward a sort of neutralism in view of its common
border with the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, not only would Turkey's adherence to
the Atlantic Pact impel the Soviet Union to divert additional forces from Eastern
Europe, but Turkish air fields would be available for NATO allies. 23 Under this
U.S. pressure, other NATO countries weakened their opposition to extendingNATO
to the eastern Mediterranean. Britain was insisting on a separate Middle East
Command under a British general, rather than extending NATO to eastern
Mediterranean. Agreement was reached after a compromise was devised to create
South European Command under an American general.
As a result, Turkey was able to enter NATO officially on February 18, 1952, as
a full-fledged member.
23 Sulzberger, C.L., "Atlantic Parley Will Arrive to Bolster Europe's,"
New York Times, September 2, 1951.
24
III. TURKEY AND NATO IN THE POSTWAR ERA
A. TURKEY'S PLACE IN NATO
Turkey's search for a formal Western commitment was now successfully
concluded. The Turks greeted their adherence to NATO with general rejoicing. Even
the tiny left wing was either so intimidated or in such disarray that it could not make
its voice heard as it had in times past.
Two aspects of the Turkish reaction appeared particularly significant for the
future. On the one hand, Turks characteristically regarded NATO as an extension
of the U.S. Hence, for example, some editorialists emphasized that "with the Atlantic
Pact, should Turkey now be attacked, America's aid is automatically guaranteed." On
the other hand, much was made of the recognition of Turkey's equality with West
European nations inherent in the agreement to include her in NATO. For the Turks,
acceptance by the Atlantic alliance was an act confirming their cherished belief that
they were, and should be recognized as, an integral part of Europe. 24
Joining NATO was not only the gain in physical security from the Soviet Union
that was important. From Ankara's point of view, an important advance over
previous connections with the West, lay in providing assurance that Turkey would
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
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continue to receive aid in quantities that could spell the success of the government's
ambitious development plans.
Moreover, there was no doubt that Foreign Minister Koprulu expressed the
general view when he told the parliament in December 1951: "Our national interests
are identical from every standpoint with the joint interests of the NATO and with its
geographic and military requirements." In this frame of mind, many Turks, especially
those in the governing party (DP), readily assumed that Turks and Americans were
intrinsically alike and that Turkey could and should become a "little America."
For the U.S. as well the assumption that Turkish-American interests were
entirely congruent now became accepted as the basic tenet of the relationship. 25 In
consequence, American planners thereafter tended to overestimate U.S. freedom of
action in Turkey; they didn't easily foresee the difficulties that would arise from using
the alliance for purposes that did not appear to be directly connected with containing
the U.S.S.R. Hence, one of the central and enduring problems of the Turkish-
American cooperation has been to define the scope of this association, a scope that
has demonstrably changed in the years since the alliance first came into being.
It was not clear from the NATO commitment what economic goals the Western
Allies and especially the U.S., were expected to meet. The Atlantic alliance implied
that Turkey was a Western nation on a par with Europe. This was not true in terms
of living standard, education, and the cultural level of the masses. Therefore, the
25 George, C. McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West," Foreign Affairs, July
1954.
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question remained open. What sort of program would the NATO allies undertake
in order to build up Turkey to bring this underdeveloped state to the level of their
European counterparts? The failure to define aims for Turkey's economic
development contributed directly to the contretemps over economic assistance that
formed one of the outstanding features of the Turkish-American relations in the next
decades.
Once Turkey entered NATO, this connection served as the general foundation
for the whole range of political, economic, and military relations between Turkey and
the U.S. Previous programs, such as economic assistance extended under the
Marshall Plan, and the military aid provided through the Truman Doctrine, were
expanded. But in the eyes of both parties, these activities were now considered to be
subsumed under NATO. In practice, this meant that both sides recognized these
programs to be continuing multi-year engagements with no projected terminal date.
Moreover, the NATO connection led to a proliferation of U.S. activities in
Turkey, from an array of special bilateral accords ordering more intimate military
cooperation to a fanning out of technical assistance projects to a great variety of
areas of Turkish life.
Through NATO membership, Turkey for the first time assumed the obligation
to coordinate defense plans with those a European army under an international
command. No longer was the protection of the country a matter for exclusive
planning by Ankara; nor was it a function of Turkish forces and their deployment
alone. Although Turkish units in peacetime were to remain under their national
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commanders, their armaments, doctrine, and organization had to be brought into
harmony with the U.S. prepared the base for this. Now, however, other NATO states
met regularly to debate issues relative to these matters in a much more intimate way.
While Turkish leaders were enjoying the NATO membership, what were the
Allies thinking of? After the initial resistance of some founder members, when
Turkey joined NATO, the experience of the Korean war still dominated the thinking
of the allies. Fearing imminent Soviet attack on Europe, the alliance partners had
set themselves the goal of fielding a conventional defense force of ninety-six
divisions, of which some forty were to be operational at all times; and yet, the
Western European states had less than twenty divisions at their disposal. Hence, the
prospect of adding some eighteen Turkish divisions—even if not on the crucial central
front—was a powerful argument for admitting Turkey in the first place. NATO
strategy assumed that presence of these forces along the frontier of the Soviet Union
would cause the Kremlin to divert significantly effectiveness to defend its Caucasus
border,thereby reducing the number of Soviet units that could be committed to
attack central Europe.
Moreover, Turkish troops were the least costly to maintain of any in the
alliance—a consideration then also commonly cited in justifying U.S. military aid
allocations.26
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
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This prospect did not dismay the Turkish leaders. On the contrary, they felt
reassured that for their enemies the cost of war had become impossibly high.
Moreover, in this era, most of the Turkish elite conceived of the world as essentially
bipolar; viewing their fate as inextricably bound up with that of all their allies, they
simply could not imagine it possible to remain outside of any conflict that might
develop between the U.S.S.R. and the West.
A more important problem for the future, however, lay in another aspect of the
military relationship. The NATO agreement was soon complemented by bilateral
understandings dealing with specific facets of Turkish-American military
cooperation. 27 Some of these understandings were full-fledged agreements, openly
published and ratified by the Turkish parliament; for example, the Status of Forces
Agreement of June 1954, which provided privileges and immunities for non-
diplomatic personnel in the service of the U.S. government. Other understandings
took the form of public exchanges of notes indicating agreement on certain
procedural questions.
But in addition, there were secret exchanges of notes and executive agreements
concerning such matters as the deployment of weapons systems in Turkey and the
right of U.S. personnel to carry on activities of a military or intelligence nature. Most
Class notes at the Turkish Naval Academy, Turkey-Super Powers
Relations, 1985.
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basic of these was the Military Facilities Agreement of June 1954, an understanding
concluded in accordance with a Turkish Cabinet meeting.28
Under the NATO arrangement, the Americans were the primary element
involved in the Turkish military establishment. The other Atlantic Pact allies had
little day-to-day contact with Turkish armed forces and furnished relatively little to
bolster Turkish capabilities in the beginning of the membership. The European
powers were still in the postwar recovery phase and had no significant military
surplus to offer Turkey even at a price. In fact, Turkish leaders preferred it that way.
Like their NATO associates in general, they saw the U.S. as the essential force to
lend credence to the alignment; they also trusted in Washington's disinterest perhaps
more than in that of the European. Thus, they ever urged strong U.S. leadership and
a prominent role for America in the alliance.
In the specific cases of Turkey and Greece, containment policy aimed at
preventing the Soviet Union from gaining control of Europe's flank in the Eastern
Mediterranean. While Turkey's admission to NATO was essentially a continuation
of this policy, it must be also seen in the context of new international developments.
The most important of these was the Korean War, which was viewed in the West as
the opening round of a new, aggressive phase in Soviet policy for which Europe
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
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could be next possible target. It also showed that the policy of containment was
inadequate without the willingness and capability to fight a limited war. 29
Apprehension about over-extending the Alliance's area of responsibility into the
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East had been among the reasons for
NATO's previous reluctance to admit Turkey, as had social, cultural and economic
differences. When the containment strategy was reformulated in the lights of the
Korean War experience, so as to draw a clear line around the Soviet Union and
support that frontier with strategic air power, the implications of Turkish accession
changed. Turkish bases became important, and Turkey helped to complete the
frontier from Norway to the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Her consent to
participate in a Middle Eastern Command promised to extend the frontier still
further in order to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East. The large Turkish
army became an asset at a time when strategic thinking assigned a significant
deterrent value to local ground forces.30
As NATO strategy and defense plans evolved to suit new needs and new
circumstances, Turkey's role also changed. NATO began to incorporate tactical and
theater nuclear weapons into its strategy between 1954 and 1957. Evidence appearing
in the autumn of 1957 that the Soviet Union was advancing towards an ICBM
capability increased the U.S.'s sense of vulnerability and led her to deploy Jupiter
29 Wolfe, Thomas, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970, 1970.
Osgood, Robert, NATO, The Entangling Alliance, 1962.
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and Thor IRBM in Europe as an interim measure, and after the NATO Council
meeting in December 1957 Turkey consented to the stationing of the Jupiters on her
soil. With the deployment of the Polaris SLBM, these IRBM became obsolete and
were withdrawn from Turkey in 1963 but not before the Cuban missile crisis had
allowed Khrushchev to tie the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba to the
removal of the Jupiters from Turkey. 31 Turkey then appeared very vulnerable both
to a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear attack and to a retaliatory strike. During the Cuban
crisis, as during the U-2 incident of 1960, the concept of 'hostage Europe' was viewed
in Turkey as 'hostage Turkey.'
The advent of a policy of mutual assured destruction in the late 1960s and the
attainment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union changed the rules of super power
interaction and opened the way for dialogue; containment became much less
relevant. And, in the 1960s, NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response. Some
have argued that such a strategy would tend to make Turkey less secure, because it
might encourage limited moves by the Soviet Union against NATO's less strongly
defended flanks in the expectation that the Alliance would not be likely to use
nuclear weapons in this eventuality. It was also argued that a limited Soviet
aggression of this kind against Turkey might fail to activate NATO. It has been
suggested, too, that Turkey could be a target for Soviet nuclear pre-emption because
Hafner, Donal, JFK, Cuba and U.S. Missiles in Turkey, 1977.
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the American bases on her territory might tempt the U.S.S.R. to initiate a limited
nuclear exchange.32
Although the debate on doctrine has somewhat abated, apprehension over
Turkey's inability to modernize her conventional capability to meet the requirements
of the new strategy has remained. This concern must be seen in the wider context
of the continuing assessment among Western strategists that NATO has become
relatively more vulnerable on the flanks. Reports to the effect that if the Soviet
Union demanded direct lines of access to the Middle East and gave Turkey an
ultimatum, the Alliance might urge Turkey to accommodate may approximate to
reality, they certainly aggravate Turkish anxiety. It is understandable that NATO has
continued to look inward, "hypnotized by the central region," as Sir Peter Hill-Norton
has put it, where lies the route to the heartland of NATO.What is not
understandable is that again in his words, "it is very hard indeed to persuade even
the Council and the Military Committee to give any serious weight, much less due
weight,to the Flanks. Does history not show that an aggressor will not always seek
chinks in the defender's armor?"
At the same time, the Soviet Union began to acquire global reach. The
U.S.S.R. out-flanked Turkey and established her influence in the Middle East and
a presence in the Mediterranean. Together, these forward moves enhanced Turkey's
value for Western security. The control of the Turkish Straits and Turkish airspace
Vali, Ferenc A., Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of
Turkey, 1971.
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have become more critical for the defense of Western interests in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East, and they are generally seen as Turkey's major tasks in NATO
defense.
The current assessment seemed to be that Turkey remains vital to the security
of NATO's southern flank and that, while she is not directly vital to the defense of
the central sector, her contribution will be important indirectly, because "if southern
flank is not secure, other NATO forces, particularly those in central Europe will be
greatly weakened and the defense of the center cannot be separated from the
defense of either flank." 33
NATO strategy for the defense of Turkey relied almost exclusively on the
Turkish Armed Forces. Evasiveness in official circles on the subject of
reinforcements leads one to assume that Turkey cannot count on them, and in any
case facilities for their speedy and orderly reception are limited. The Allied
Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force was more symbolic in peacetime as a sign
of political will to come to the assistance of a threatened NATO member than as a
defense force in time of conflict, when it would be too small to make much
difference. Turkey's geographical isolation has already made for logistic problems.
If NATO assistance is in doubt, it follows that Turkey must try to develop her
conventional defense capability in peacetime so as to be able to face any opponent
alone in war.
Collins, John, and Chwat, John Steven, Greece and Turkey: Some
Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East, 1975.
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B. CYPRUS: TURKEY VS. NATO
Turkey's relationship with the Alliance was tested by the Cyprus conflict, first
in 1964, and again in 1974.
1. 1964 Conflict and Johnson's Letter
The persistence of intercommunal armed clashes in Cyprus after
December 1963 and the failure of both diplomatic attempts and the UN Force in
Cyprus to resolve the situation led Turkey to contemplate military intervention
several times in 1964. Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, signed when the
Republic of Cyprus was established, permits unilateral action to restore the status
quo, if collective action by the guarantor powers—Britain, Greece and Turkey—fails.
In June 1964, the U.S. warned Turkey against military action. This warning (known
as 'Johnson's letter' in public) forestalled Turkish intervention, but also shook Turkey
out of the comfortable feeling of security she had found in NATO, for President
Johnson reminded her that:
a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement
by the Soviet Union. I hope that you will understand that your NATO allies
have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect
Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet
intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.
Turkish Prime Minister Inonu replied that:
There exists between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic
principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to
us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a
member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of
justification. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of
the situation of their fellow member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this
aggression provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an
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obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such
discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would
lose its meaning. 34
The Cyprus conflict of 1964 marked the turning point in Turkey's foreign
policy. This was not simply because of the frustrations she felt when prevented from
pursuing a national policy over Cyprus, nor because Greece, an ally, also appeared
to pose a threat. More important was the sudden realization that subtle changeswere
taking place in the interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union that
were bounded to affect the security relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. The
Johnson Letter explicitly told Turkey that neither the security afforded by the Nato
under American leadership nor the Soviet threat were unconditional and irreversible
proportions. The leader of NATO had explained that she differentiated between the
types of Soviet threat and reserved to herself the right to define when and under
what conditions the Soviet Union could be a threat to the security of Turkey.
This American re-examination and refinement of the Soviet threat forced
a fundamental change in the Turkish view of the security afforded by NATO. Prime
Minister Inonu realized that the Cold War was over beyond doubt, and the major
theme of his foreign policy statements in subsequent years was constant caution
against involvement in the issues between the superpowers. This was a complete
reversal for a statesman who was one of the first to come out on the side of the
United States during the Cuban missile crisis only two years ago. According to the
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Turkish leaders, the security formula of the cold war years (exclusive reliance on the
U.S. and unswerving hostility to the U.S.S.R.) was no longer realistic and could be
dangerous for Turkey.
For the next ten years Turkey tried to make readjustments. References
to the Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence increased, particularly in unofficial
circles. The NATO continued to be the basis of her security policy but it was felt to
be essential to enhance Turkey's individual security by dissociating herself somewhat
from the global policies of the U.S., by limiting security commitments to NATO and
by softening the rigid evaluation of the threat from the Soviet Union. It became a
deliberate Turkish objective not to provoke the Soviet Union. Risks in security
cooperation came to be weighed against gains. Cancellation of American
reconnaissance flights from Turkey over the Soviet Union in 1965, the negotiation
with the U.S. of the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and refusal to allow
the use of bases in Turkey for missions during the June 1967 and October 1973
Middle East Wars serve as examples of this new policy.
2. 1974 Conflict and U.S. Arms Embargo
The dilemma posed by Cyprus and Greece, which plagued Turkey's
alliance relations since 1964, reached a new climax in the summer of 1974. A coup
on July by Greek officers of National Guard and the National Organization of
Cypriot Fighters (EOKA-B) overthrew Makarios Government and installed an ex-
EOKA terrorist, Nicos Sampson, as President of Cyprus. Turkey feared enosis, since
the coup appeared to have been encouraged by the military government in Greece.
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She failed to persuade Britain to undertake joint intervention and therefore launched
an unilateral offensive, "Cyprus Peace Operation."
The UN Security Council Resolution 353 called for a cease fire, the
withdrawal of foreign troops and the initiation of negotiations. Two Geneva
Conferences were unable to settle peace on the island. Following these failures, a
second offensive, launched on 14-17 August in order to consolidate the Turkish
foothold. Later, the question of Turkish interests and presence became further bound
up with Turkish domestic politics. And in international politics Turkey experienced
hard times.
The imposition of an arms embargo against Turkey by the U.S. Congress,
on the grounds that her use of U.S. supplied weapons during the intervention was
a violation of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales
Act, complicated the chances for settlement. On the other hand, the embargo created
a strong Turkish desire to resist foreign pressure; on the other, it fostered Greek
hopes that Turkey would have to give way to that pressure.
The effects of Cyprus conflict, the arms embargo and the Greek-Turkish
hostilities brought Turkish-American relations almost to breaking point. Turkey
argued that the Cyprus conflict and defense cooperation were separate issues and
that curtailing the flow of equipment and spare parts was a hostile act, and
moreover, one that undermined her overall defense capability. NATO military
officials, including the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Haig, pointed
out that the Turkish Armed Forces had lost about half of their effectiveness,
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particularly in the Air Force, and Admiral Shear, then Commander of the South
Forces of NATO, agreed that they were suffering in terms of readiness.
As a result of the U.S. arms embargo which was imposed upon Turkey
in 1975 and left partially in effect for too many years, the ability of Turkey to carry
out its NATO responsibilities was severely compromised. By 1978, the Turkish
Armed Forces were operating at less than 50 percent effectiveness; and it was
estimated that these forces would be reduced to only 20 percent effectiveness if the
embargo was sustained for another two years. After prolonged debate, the Congress
voted to lift the embargo on August 2, 1978. 35
Despite the lifting of the embargo, however, it soon became clear that
Turkey was still confronted with substantial problems that impaired its ability to
revamp its armed forces and carry out its NATO role. On the other hand, against
the background of the arms race with Greece, Turkey now engaged in an ambitious
military procurement program, which strained the economy. Turkey's traditional
reliance on one source of supply, together with the need to maintain technological
continuity, the rudimentary nature of her indigenous arms industry and weakness in
the heavy industrial base, created difficulties, as did the scarcity of foreign exchange
and her political isolation.
American Foreign Policy Institute, NATO Security and the Turkish
Economy, 1979.
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The cumulative impact of the arms embargo on Turkish security was
profound. Having once realized how vulnerable her defense capability was to external
manipulation, Turkey would never again trust her security to allies in quite the same way.
Because the arms embargo came at a time of superpower detente, it could
have implied either that the U.S. believed that the U.S.S.R. would not act against
Turkey or that it would not act against Turkey or that it would not matter if she did.
The embargo could have been interpreted as a signal to the Soviet Union of a
reduction of the American commitment to Turkey's defense.
On the other hand, Turkey's initial reserve and watchfulness about super
power detente and its effects on Europe derived from the logical conclusion that it
would inevitably touch on military alliances and her own security policy. Certain
major questions emerged from statements of government officials on detente in the
mid-1970s. Would it lead to the final elimination of the bipolar system? What would
emerge as the dominant features and rules of conduct of the new system? Would
these possible changes imply equal security for Turkey, and if not, would Turkey
suddenly find herself in a security vacuum? Anxiety over the unknown led Turkey to
stress on the one hand that defense must not be neglected and, on the other hand
the detente process must include the smaller forces. If detente in the first part of the
1970s was not a solid basis for peace, but at most a calculated hope that required
calculated moves, the preservation of a strong defense seemed to be essential pre-
condition.
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As a result, the credibility of American security commitments was eroded
by the arms embargo on Turkey. Turkish Armed Forces suffered badly as a result
of this embargo, but the real damage was psychological. By obliterating the
distinction between allies and enemies, the embargo greatly reinforced Ankara's
suspicions that in the event of a Soviet aggression the U.S. might leave Turkey to
fend for itself. The embargo not only failed to promote a settlement in Cyprus, but
also worked against Western security interests by weakening further the defense
posture of the Southern Flank.
Finally the embargo affair revealed to the Turks the extent to which the
U.S. Congress was beginning to play an increasingly influential role in important
foreign policy and security decisions. 36 Domestic political issues and special interest
groups in the U.S. were now essential components of the U.S. foreign policy decision
making process. This caused some anxiety in Turkish political circles: What sort of
reliance could be placed on an allied nation where vital decisions were made by a
legislative body that enjoyed power without accepting responsibility for it, and which
was so vulnerable to pressure from special interest groups?
The three year arms embargo helped to elevate the security and peace
aspects of detente to a more prominent position in Turkish security thinking in the
second half of the 1970s. It transformed detente into a major supplement to the
security sought through military defense arrangements. The need to reaffirm trust
36 Chipman, John, NATO's Southern Allies, 1988.
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in detente and pursue a peaceful posture in her exposed position has been reinforced
as the problems with the U.S. cut deeper into the later's credibility and as the sense
of isolation from Western Europe increased.
All these developments led Turkish leader to diversify Turkey's foreign
policy and to establish Turkey's own defense industry, but her security policies would
base on NATO strategy again. So, Turkish governments placed a far greater
emphasis on developing relations with Middle Eastern nations. On the other hand,
Turkey went on buying from foreign markets on a scale that is bound to upset
domestic priorities (see tables la and lb for details), to come anywhere close to
NATO standards, since she didn't have a domestic defense industry. Especially in
1980s there was attempts to establish her own defense industry such as Defense
Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDA). After a while, Turkey
would get the first results of her own defense industry.
While NATO was dealing with its internal problems such as the tension
between Turkey and Greece in its southern flank, two blocs, NATO and Warsaw,
were experiencing a period of relaxation of tendencies which was a decade detente
as we talked above. It did, however, create a period of non-direct confrontation and
peaceful co-existence which finally fell apart with the invasion of Afghanistan in late
1979, ushering in a sense the second part of the cold war. Gorbachev, however,
brought to an end the antagonism that had existed in the early 1980s and which had
been as equally dangerous as the first part of the cold war.
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3. Turkish Armed Forces and NATO Obligations
Turkey has made a major contribution to NATO since 1952. During the
postwar era, the Turkish Armed Forces were the second largest in NATO and
represent 37% of the standing military personnel available to the Western Alliance.
Turkey defended 27% of NATO Europe and 37% of the allied frontier with the
Warsaw Pact, including a 610 km border with the Soviet Union. Also Turkey shared
a frontier with a Warsaw Pact member, Bulgaria.37
Turkey's traditional role in NATO has been concerned with the control
of the Straits and the prevention of any Warsaw Pact advance towards the Middle
East. And NATO strategy for the success of the Turkey's role relied almost on the
Turkish Armed Forces. But Turkish Armed Forces faced immense geographical,
logistical and economic problems in their attempts to maintain their obligations.
Turkey had an underdeveloped economy which was unable to equip forces
to NATO standards was acknowledged from the very beginning of Turkey's
association with NATO, even though Turkey has regularly ranked among the first
five of NATO members in terms of the proportion of GNP devoted to defense.
Turkey's GNP was also one of the lowest among NATO members (see tables la and
ib).
Therefore, this underdeveloped economic situation affected the armed
forces. Turkish Armed Forces in the 1940s, described by Alastair Buchanan as a
Jane's NATO Handbook, "Turkey: Country Studies," 1990/1991.
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form of outdoor relief, had progressed little beyond World War I in its levels of
equipment. The equipment level of the Turkish Armed Forces has always depended
on a trade of between numbers and sophistication. Population growth since World
War II, combined with an emphasis on conscription, has produced a long term trend
of steady increase in numbers. During the World War II, the size of forces rose to
800,000 men, and was still around 700,000 when Turkey joined the Alliance. During
the 1950s, largely as a result of U.S. advice, it was reduced to around 400,000 men
(see table 2 for further comparison). 38
So, to maintain its obligations, Turkey was in need of NATO assistance,
and cooperation with NATO countries. In practice, assistance and cooperation with
NATO meant American access to Turkish territory for facilities and bases, and the
improvement of the defense capability of the Turkish Armed Forces with the
American help. Of course Turkey was not the only NATO country dependent on
U.S. military assistance—American support for Europe was an essential aspect of the
Atlantic Alliance-but in late 1970s we see that the developed European members
have emerged as economic and industrial powers, while Turkey has merely reached
a take off stage and stayed there.
Under the agreements, U.S. instructors were brought in and service
manuals translated into Turkish. U.S. troops and military installations began to
operate on Turkish soil. Turkey was the third in the list of recipients U.S. aid, after
38 Bachard, David, Turkey and the West, 1985.
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Israel and Egypt. For example, between 1946 and 1974, Turkey received $3.7 billion
in military assistance, the form of assistance changing over time from grants to
credits and cash sales.39
But, the annual lobbying and skirmishing in the U.S. Congress to get the
administration's aid proposals accepted places major strains on Turkish-American
relations and was described as nerve-racking by Turkish officials, not least when the
effort runs up against U.S. Greek and Armenian (and sometimes pro-Israeli) lobbies
trying to get the size of the package reduced. After the Cyprus conflict of 1974, and
especially during the 1980s, there was great pressures on Congress and U.S
government from these lobbies, to give these aids under some conditions such as
related with the solution in Cyprus conflict. And there was similar tendencies among
other NATO members against Turkey. And these behaviors affected the relations
between Turkey and NATO.
In addition to U.S., in 1964, West Germany became the second major
source of military help, providing about DM 35 million of assistance annually in the
1960s, and rising to an annual DM 70 million in the 1970s. In 1980s, German
assistance continued to increase for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces.
But especially in 1980s, German and NATO's other European members' limited
assistance began to be under some conditions such as Cyprus issue, human rights and
"Controversy Over the Cutoff of Military Aid to Turkey," Congressional
Digest, April 1975.
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democratic institutions. And these developments affected the course of relations
negatively and changed the form and amount of the assistance.
But the Turkish officials became aware of the situation especially after the
Cyprus conflict of 1974. Turkey was in need of a domestic defense industry. At this
time, Turkey was, according to Eurogroup descriptions a Category A member
country, which is one with no or virtually no, industrial bases and thus not in a
position to produce or co-produce a wide range of sophisticated equipment. So, such
a country needs external aid to finance its defense effort. When the defense effort
is dependent on several factors, as in the case of Turkey in this period, long-term
national planning can be highly uncertain exercise.
Until the mid-1980s Turkey was not in a position to benefit from
cooperative developments in European weapons procurement, partly because no
comparable evolution has taken place in her economic and industrial development.
Although industry has reached a level of when it can undertake substantial defense
production, the need for capital and for technology transfer has been a major
obstacle. Defense production has not made a significant contribution to the national
economy, and defense cooperation with the other NATO members in the meantime
has continued to be confined to financial assistance in the form of credits. The pace
of technological change was such as to make credit arrangements politically
unattractive both the donor and the recipient countries.
Turkey was formally a member of the Eurogroup and the Independent
European Programma Group but in practice her membership has not resulted in
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concrete schemes for cooperation, apart from West German cooperation in the
development of the shipbuilding industry. Elaborate ideas developed to promote a
two-way street between the U.S. and European NATO. Turkey was not considered
in this context.
Like the developed members of NATO in Europe, Turkey felt the need
to cooperate in the procurement of defense equipment, but her traditional position
as an American protege and the wide gap in the level of development between
Turkey and the other European members have prevented the emergence of a
dialogue on how unequal allies should cooperate for security.
Turkey attempted to solve her defense industry problems. But there were
economic problems and a lack of access to high technology. In attempt to overcome
some of these deficiencies, the Turkish Government established the Defense Industry
Development and Support Administration (DIDA) in 1985.40 DIDA is central in
Turkish plans to build an economically viable indigenous defense manufacturing
industry. It is responsible for the management of a fund which will be used to
encourage investment in Turkey. Investment of projects is partly determined by the
ease in which they can be integrated with the Turkish defense industry and cost
effectiveness. One of the DIDA's main objectives is to create defense products of
NATO standard in specification and quality control.
40
Jane's NATO Handbook, "Turkey: Country Studies," 1991/1992.
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DIDA has had already a galvanizing impact on the Turkish defense
industry. Significant aerospace enterprise, rocket and missile systems projects, new
types of frigates and submarines were the first results of this attempt. But, despite
the remarkable progress which has been made in developing a viable and relatively
diverse defense industry, economic instability threatened to undermine the
modernization progress in late 1980s.
4. Turkey-NATO relations under the Resource Dependency Theory
Resource Dependency Theory will help us to present some ideas
concerning the interactions between an organization and the environment, and to
demonstrate the implications of these ideas for the design of management control
systems. Also we will see how best to organize in order to cope with the effects of
complexity and unpredictability in the environment. 41
Let's think about NATO and its environment. Interactions with
environment can be dealt in two parts. First part is internal control system, namely
the goal formation process. According to the theory the meaning of the goal does not
imply that goals well defined or permanent, but suggests that they are multifaceted,
possibly conflicting and subject to change within the organization. And also it says
that individuals and groups in the organization have needs which they expect the
organization to satisfy, and these needs will differ between individuals and between
41
Pfeffer and Salanick, Resource Dependency Theory, 1978.
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groups. On the other hand the goals are based on value judgments by those who set
the standard.
In NATO's case, in the beginning of the formation of the alliance, it was
for sure that all parties had the common problem that is Soviet threat. And they
accepted a common defense strategy. But later in response to developments of Soviet
strategies, and new weapons systems, NATO changed its strategy. But this time we
saw some states' needs differed from the others'. For example, Turkey had many
complaints that this new strategy (flexible response) didn't fit her security needs. But
NATO couldn't find a good solution which fits to all parties' needs.
On the other hand, to implement the defined strategies, NATO countries
had to have some certain standards in military organizations and troop and
equipments must be at the planned level. In this case, again every country was in
need of different kinds of aid. Turkey, at her entrance date, was the poorest country
and her military needed more aid than others. But, as noted earlier, there wasn't
clear goals that at which level and kind of aid will be give to Turkey. When we
reached 1980s, we saw that Turkey was in the same situation, there wasn't any
change in her military capabilities. Turkey was still in the worst category in
comparison to other NATO countries.
Also conflicts or similarities between the interests and goals cause
problem in the organization. When we look at the Turkish-Greek relations, the
conflicts between these countries led them to use some of their resources against
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each other, not their common threat. And this has weakened the defense of the
Southern Region.
Theory suggests that where there is significant interdependence between
group, the ability of any group to control its own pattern of contribution will depend
on its ability to influence others within the organization. When dependence on a
particular resource is high, then the organization is similarly dependent on those who
control access to it. The more critical the resource to the success or survival of the
organization, then the greater the power of those who can ensure its constant
availability.
In NATO, Turkey, with its geopolitical position and large number of
troops, had an important resource when she entered the Alliance. Other NATO
countries accepted her membership because of this reason. They were in need of this
kind contribution. But what Turkey did was not use this advantage for her own
benefit. In the cold war period, Turkish leaders couldn't think to use important
resources to get more aid or to determine strategies which will be more suitable to
her defense needs. They couldn't affect the organization to act for her own needs.
But in the contrary, Turkey's economic and military needs were used as
an control mechanism against Turkey. Turkey was dependent on this external aid.
And the U.S. was the only power controlling activities within the organization by its
economic and military power. Turkey didn't plan to get rid of this effects until early
1980s. After this, Turkey began to establish its domestic defense industry, and to
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develop her economic power with new economic policies, to get rid of these external
effects.
The second part of the theory is external control, that is the demands
made upon the organization by powerful actors of its environment. This part can be
explained by NATO-Warsaw Pact relations. This time relations between different
organizations are the subjects. Like internal groups, in the external environment
there are different organizations which compete with each other to control some
resources for their own needs and effectiveness. The main goal of the Warsaw Pact
was to expand the communist regime to other countries by any means. And all
countries were its possible targets. And Czechoslovakia, Korea, Afghanistan were
some test points against NATO. Both Organization attempt to control important
strategic points (a resource for the success of both organization) to implement their
goals.
In this context Turkey was an explicit target by the U.S.S.R in early
postwar period. Turkey was an important resource for both organizations. So in
postwar period Turkey sometimes found herself at top of the disputes between the
superpowers. But Turkish leaders couldn't use Turkey's situation as a weapon to take
an advantage in the world politics, except joining NATO.
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IV. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POSTWAR ERA
A. INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
Admission to NATO fixed Turkey's place in the West. The initiative for
increasing ties with the U.S. and later for membership of NATO had come during
the last years of the Republican People Party (RPP) Administration. The landslide
victory of the Democrat Party in 1950 therefore only strengthened the new direction
of Turkey's foreign and defense policies. Prime Minister Menderes was an articulate
supporter of the idea of solidarity with the free world. Except for some opposition
to legal and procedural matters by the major opposition party, bipartisan foreign
policy was the rule until the 1960s.
The security link with Europe was buttressed by others. Membership or ties of
association with a number of western European institutions, ultimately aimed at
European unity or integration of one type or another, broadened the relationship
into the political, social, and economic spheres. Having been a recipient of Marshall
Plan assistance, Turkey became a member of the OEEC, in 1949 she became a
member of the European Council, and in 1964 an associate member of the EEC.
Within a decade, Turkey became, for all political and strategic purposes, a member
of the West. Although socially and economically she lagged far behind, there was
domestic consensus which looked forward to full association with the West until the
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mid 1960s. But later, Turkish leaders looked for more diversified foreign policies,
because of the Western countries actions which stemmed from especially the Cyprus
conflicts.
On the other hand, while Turkey was enjoying democratic freedoms and
institutions during the interwar and cold war periods, the circle of decision makers
has expanded beyond the small elite of the 1940s, then made up of the party officials
and bureaucrats, newly emerged social groups vie with each other to have an effect
in the formulation of official policy. Many people have travelled abroad and returned
with new ideas, communication networks have increased, and television entered
almost every home, bringing world events readily to people's attention. A new and
less Eurocentric generation with new ideas has joined the ranks of the foreign policy
decision makers in the following years.
Meanwhile, they learned that their daily problems are more like those
encountered by the people of the third world countries than those of Europeans.
Domestic priorities have become more important at the moment when alternative
ways merged of looking at the world in general and security issues in particular. And
Turkey's domestic political, economic and social structure become diversified. Now
we can look at how these developments effected the Turkish leaders while they were
deciding the Turkey's security issues.
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1. Decision Making Process
Under the constitution of 1921 and during the years of War of
Independence against the occupying powers after the World War I, parliament in
Ankara (the Grand National Assembly) played a determining role in foreign affairs
and defense. But the subsequent constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982 considerably
reduced the role of the legislative in foreign and defense policies. During the post
war era and at present, the Council of Ministers, presided over by the Prime Minister
and advised by the National Security, appears to be the main decision making organ.
In case of vital national interest, the cabinet may be chaired by the President of
Republic, and the Chief of the General Staff also attends the meeting. The reports
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the advice of the Chief of the General Staff
usually play a considerable part in governmental decisions on security policy. The
Ministry of National Defense seems more to execute policies than to make strategic
decisions. It deals with the political, legal, social, and financial aspects of national
defense. It is responsible, within the framework of the principles and priorities
decided on by the General Staff, for the recruitment of the armed forces, weapons
procurement, the defense industry, infrastructure, military health services, and
financial matters.
The National Security has been playing a growing role in security affairs.
Its main function is to advise the Council of Ministers on the formulation and
implementation of the national security policy of the state. The constitution of 1982
provides that the Council of Minsters shall give priority consideration to the
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decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems
necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the
integrity and indivisibility of the country and civil peace.
In the terms of the 1982 constitution, the office of the Commander-in-
Chief is inseparable from the spiritual existence of the Grand National Assembly,
and is represented by the President of the Republic.
Naturally the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Grand National
Assembly for foreign affairs, national security, and the organization of the armed
forces. The annual parliamentary debate on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs provides an opportunity to discuss foreign policy questions. These questions,
and security matters in general, can be brought at any time before the Assembly by
its members. In practice, however, the legislative branch has little control on the
defense policy in the strictest sense. Defense is regarded as a question of vital
national interest, and is usually kept outside of political conflicts. The strategic
choices are made by the General Staff, and are implemented by the Council of
Ministers normally without parliamentary restriction.
Treaties are usually ratified and promulgated by the President of the
Republic. Although the ratification of treaties is legally subject to adoption by the
Assembly, agreements in connection with the implementation of a treaty, or
administrative agreements concluded on the basis of special legal authorization, do
not require parliamentary approval.
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A parliamentary enactment in 1963 authorized the Council of Ministers
to conclude all the international agreements related to NATO without recourse to
the legislative. In the 1960s and 1970s, the constitutionality of this law was subject
to long discussions in the Turkish legal community. Nevertheless, the Constitutional
Court decided on 4 March 1965 in favor of this law and practice. For example, in
conformity with the same law, the government concluded on 18 November 1980, the
Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy between Turkey and the U.S.,
and all the supplementary agreements annexed to it.
The government's decision to send troops to the Korean War provoked
a long public discussion on the respective powers of the Grand National Assembly
and the Council of Ministers. So, the constitutions of 1961 and 1982, in order to
eliminate the ambiguities of the constitution of 1924, unequivocally gave the Grand
National Assembly the authority to declare war, to send Turkish forces to foreign
countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey.
Notwithstanding this provision, the constitution of 1982 authorizes the President of
the Republic to decide, while the parliament is in recess, on the use of the armed
forces if the country is subjected to armed aggression.
2. Socio-economic Situation
Post war internal and external developments helped to shape a new
attitude to the world as well as affecting internal political and economic priorities.
Aspirations for economic development coincided with the introduction of political
liberalization in the immediate post war period. The country opted for a place in the
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West and welcomed western foreign assistance. The intensified economic activity of
the 1950s, subsidized in part by American assistance and operating within a
liberalized political framework, had a profound impact on the political and socio-
economic profile of the country.
The alternative to one-party government and the offer of economic
freedom and rewards spurred record voter participation and accelerated business
initiative. The rural masses aspired to relief from endemic poverty, business and
commercial interest groups enjoyed new profits, and new middle class expanded.
Technical, managerial and professional skills increased, and the possessors of these
modern skills and the new rich began to compete for political power.
What started as an ambitious development venture in the post war period
brought about considerable economic growth, after planned development began in
1962.42 The average annual rate of growth in GDP was 5.5% in 1963-67, 6.7% in
1968-72, and 7.1% in 1973-77. Per capita income of about $100 in the 1950s rose to
about $300 in the mid-1960s and $1000 in the mid-1970s. Increasing industrialization
attracted the rural population to the cities at the same time as the mechanization of
agriculture released more people from the land; migration from the villages to the
cities accounted for 42.6% of urbanization in the 1960s and 63% in the 1970s.
Industrialization has turned labor into a power group, and efficient trade-
unionism and the right to collective bargaining (granted in 1963) bolstered its
The State Planning Organization, Developments in the Economy of
Turkey (1963-1978), 1978.
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position. These developments have significantly altered industrial relations in favor
of labor and improved the status and buying power of the expanding working class.
However, the frequency and duration of industrial disputes involving pay rises and
fringe benefits have put Turkey among the first in Europe in terms of the number
of days lost on strikes.
Economic growth has improved living standards in general but the
development process has been painful. The development strategy was based on
import substitution. Borrowing from external sources and inflationary measures were
the major means of financing development. But we can see a dramatic
transformation in the structure of the economy, as the following figures show (sectors
as percentage of GNP): 43
TABLE I.
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Agriculture 37.9 31.0 26.2 22.5 22.0 17.9
Industry 15.9 19.6 22.3 24.4 24.5 27.0
Services 42.7 4.4 46.8 47.9 46.1 48.9
43 Barchard, David, Turkey and the West, 1985.
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Despite this structural change from agriculture towards industry, however,
neither the State Economic Enterprises, which constitute the backbone of industry,
with their unproductive resource allocations and uninspired management, nor private
enterprise, which found supplying the large domestic markets, could reach the
necessary level of exports.
The momentum and costs of development could be maintained as long
as there was no major shock in the international environment that would upset the
pattern of import substitution and the means of financing it. Concessional aid began
to dwindle in the 1970s, but the adverse effects of this trend were compensated for
largely by the foreign currency remittances of the Turkish guest workers employed
in Western Europe, mostly in West Germany, following Turkey's association with the
EEC in 1964.
After 1975, however, Turkey began to feel the effects of developments in
the world economy. The rise in the price of oil and petroleum products, the recession
in the West and the rise in the price of capital and intermediary goods which figured
regularly on her import list threatened the growth rate target. The remittances of
workers decreased. The bill for crude oil increased from $124 million in 1972 to $1.2
billion in 1977, and overall import bill almost quadrupled in the same period,
jumping from about $1.5 billion to $5.8 billion.
By 1978, the economy had reached a point where investment had to be
slowed down. There was an amounting balance of payments deficit, and to make up
for the deficit Turkey borrowed heavily from foreign commercial banks over short
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terms and at high interest rates and cashed her reserves. The means of generating
the foreign currency needed for imports—external resource transfers and exports-
seemed to have reached their limits by 1977-78 and imports of raw materials and
equipment have had to be cut down.
Given such a backlog of problems, it was inevitable that economic policy
should have become one of the central themes of debate. The economic crisis has
focused both the policy makers' and intellectuals' attention on the question of the
relevance of the capitalist road to development for Turkey. Her experiences have
demonstrated the inter-dependence between, on one hand, domestic development,
foreign trade and the international monetary system, and, on the other hand, the
dangerous vulnerability of a developing economy to international economic and
financial fluctuations.
Issues not directly economic have also widened the range of problems.
The Turkish population increased dramatically. In the early 1960s, when planned
economic development became official policy, the high rate of population growth was
recognized as one of the impediments to development, and modest moves for family
planning were undertaken by the Ministry of Health. But, the pressure of population
growth on the economy did not appear to be an issue for any of the political parties.
Another source of strain on the economy has been the increase in defense
expenditures in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The defense share of total
government expenditures jumped from 20.5% in 1974, to 26.6% in 1976. It stabilized
at around 22% in 1977-78. (see table lb for details).
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After these developments, Turkish governments tried to find some
solutions to these problems, and they had some interactions with some international
organizations such as IMF, OECD, and EEC. In addition to these external attempts,
there was some internal attempts such as curbing spending, tax reform, to fix the
economy. An entirely new package, geared to liberal principles was implemented in
early 1980. New measures counted on market forces, limited state intervention and
new foreign loans and credits to be negotiated with the OECD countries and the
IMF to remobilze productive capacity and to curb inflation.
In 1983, after the 1980 coup, new Turkish government led by Ozal,
introduced further changes to the economy. The Ozal government appeared to have
a Japanese model behind its thinking, in which a strong economy geared towards
exports retains distinctive and indeed rather isolationist cultural and traditional
values. And the full membership application on 14 April 1987 for EEC was one
biggest and boldest attempts of Ozal government.
Since 1980 the government has committed itself to cutting subsidies and
reducing overmanning in the State Economic Enterprises. The private sector
manufacturing has continued to grow steadily during the 1980s. The volume of
foreign trade has risen sharply. Exports have risen while imports grew less swiftly.
Shortages and power cuts have disappeared. Most strikingly, GNP increased
dramatically (see table 3 for details).
Industrialization, originally seen as a defensive adaptation but during this
period viewed as the completion of an already well advanced social transformation,
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was a preoccupation of Turkish foreign policy makers. The maximization of economic
assistance and the removal of obstacles to trade, such as EC quota restrictions on
Turkish textile exports, were typical themes. On the other hand, Turkey has not
developed specialized commercial and economic services for exporters within its
diplomatic services,although the importance of economic diplomacy, as well as that
of the job of deputy under secretary for economic affairs in the Foreign Ministry, has
increased markedly since 1980.
When we have reached the late 1980s, while very fast and unpredictable
developments were occurring all around the world, especially in Eastern Block
countries, the developments occurred in Turkey, were likely to bring Turkey into the
mainstream of the international business world and world politics.
3. Political Culture
The experiences with modernization in late 1940s and 1950s--exposure to
political opposition, competitive politics and popular participation, social reforms,
expanded national education, improved communications, the rush to the city and
economic growth-had by then eroded most of the traditional loyalties. This changed
the earlier crude stratification of society and crystallized class consciousness around
economic interests. The efficient nation-wide party organizations of the 1950s
educated the people in the merits of the democracy, and relative emancipation from
poverty and changes in the lifestyle of both the peasantry and the urban population
as a result served to stimulate yet higher aspirations.
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In the first half of the 1960s, therefore, Turkey seemed to be ready and
willing to move to a pluralist democracy where any view and interest could be
organized to compete for political and economic power. Political democracy required
that all ideas should be allowed to find free expression, while economic democracy
required that all groups should share equitably in the allocation of national
opportunities and resources, including the wealth created by economic growth. Social
justice became a goal.
The political spectrum was refined and differentiated. The Republican
People Party (RPP) introduced a left-of-center philosophy, while Justice Party (JP)
was on the right-of-center. In 1965 a Marxist political party (Turkish Workers Party
[TWP]) entered the Assembly for the first time, a most important event for the
Turkish political development. Since the criminal law banned Communism, this party
had to call itself socialist. It did initiate the great foreign policy debate of the mid-
1960s, when the Cyprus crisis had first mobilized anti-American sentiment. For the
first time in post-war history, ties with the U.S. and NATO came under vigorous
attack in public, neutralism and non-alignmentwere proposed instead, and memories
of the Ataturk-Lenin period were revived.
Although the Left failed in electoral terms, left-wing ideologies became
popular both in the universities and more widely among the young. The TWP had
promised to lead the movement but its electoral failures and the divisions within its
own ranks made it largely ineffectual in this role. No alternative leadership emerged
and the Left broke into splinter groups. Frustrated at the ballot box, some youth
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groups turned to terror. The violence and the terror of the late 1960s brought about
the military intervention of 1971, and the subsequent drive against the Left further
diminished its strength and broke up its unity.
However, the Left's initial electoral success and its appeal to the youth
immediately made it seem a threat to the Turkish Right. This mobilized the extreme
Right into action. Terror became their weapon too. But, while rejecting organic ties
with the West, for fear that they would eliminate Turkish culture and identity, they
considered the association with NATO a necessary component of Turkish foreign
policy because of the organizations anti-Communist and anti-Soviet stand.
During this period, another significant development was the emergence
of the National Salvation Party (NSP). This has campaigned for the revival of Islamic
values and traditions. Because it viewed the penetration of Turkey by western values
and influences as part of western imperialism, it was against close ties with the West,
advocating instead cooperation with the community of Islam. Traditional votes made
this party the third largest party during the mid-1970s. It became a key party for
coalition governments.
It was a democratic view that all kinds of ideas were represented in
political life. But in late 1970s there was not any compromise between political
parties. This situation accelerated the terror in Turkey while its economic conditions
were also worsening. This brought the 1980 coup to Turkey.
After 1980 coup, these parties were closed. With the first free elections
and new political parties, Turkish political activities began in 1983. This time,
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Motherland Party (MP), which was said to represent the different political ideas in
one party, enjoyed the majority governments during the rest of 1980s. MP, led by
Ozal, introduced to Turkey new political and economic issues. The most important
one was to learn the make compromise in political life, not to fight or terror. In the
late 1980s, even though old extreme left and right parties began to be seen in
Turkish political life, they were not effective. And the Left was still looking for the
unity.
MP was a pro-Western and pro-American party. Their government actions
got big support from the West. MP government did apply for the full membership
of EC, which forwards an economic and military integration among the member
states. But first signals from the EC was negative. So this decision may change
actions of Turkish government and political parties against the West in the following
years.
4. Military in Turkish Society
The regular officer corps of the Turkish Armed Forces is trained at the
military schools and academies which are open to all classes and the candidates are
drawn from a broad social base. Most of the manpower is provided by normally
doing a certain time of compulsory service. The function of military service is not
only to teach the conscripts how to defend their country, but also to improve their
education and skills. The army plays an integrated role by mixing up recruits from
different regions and by increasing their ability to work together. These were the
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main features of Turkish army at the very first years of the Republic, and still keeps
the same.
Turkish democracy came into existence in the 1940s with the consent and
support of the armed fores. The military has emerged as the custodian of the state
and reforms against anti-secularist, communist, separatist and irredentist-fascist
movements, and as the defenders of political democracy against the continual failure
of the civilian governments to implement or protect it.44 The Turkish military's high
level of discipline and professionalism does not favor the adoption of extremist
ideologies by its officers. Despite this professionalism, however, it shows certain
praetorian tendencies. Its praetorianism does not consist of attempts at changing the
socio-political system or the main course of Turkey's security policies. 45
On the contrary, its political interventions have been of a moderating and
civilian-oriented nature. There have been three military interventions in the political
process in 1960, 1971, 1980. Although the socio-political forces motivating each
intervention differed, there was no instance where the aim of the military was to
establish an authoritarian regime. The military considered these interventions as
necessary to preserve, rather than abrogate, the country's democratic institutions.
The generals have always disliked the immersion of soldiers in political affairs to the
detriment of their military functions. Whenever the military intervened in the
44 Karpat, Kemal, Turkish Democracy at Impasse, 1981.
45
Perlmutter, Amos, The Military in Modem Times, 1977.
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political process, it did so unwillingly, and for the purpose of consolidating
democracy.
There seemed to be a general consensus that Turkey has moved closer
to the West European democratic system in late 1980s. These developments may be
taken as evidence of rapid progress in the reestablishment of the democratic system
after the 1980 coup.
Studying the 1980s' enactments, declarations and publications issued by
military, it was observed that the post- 1980 military regime has changed the
traditional republican system of ethics by infusing it with new principles.46 The
military also emphasized, in the post-1980 publications on Ataturkism, tolerance of
others' opinions as well as the need to defend the integrity of the nation. They also
took measures to reduce the patrimonial character of the civil bureaucracy and to
reform it on the basis of a purely instrumental rationale.
These developments can be read as indicating strongly that the military
no longer views civil society as a subordinate entity or itself as possessing a monopoly
of wisdom and truth. The post- 1980 behavior of the military, together with the
growing maturity of the electorate and changes in the economic system, will lead to
a better system of checks and balances which will make regulation from above a less
necessary means of moderating political conflict.
46 Heper, Metin, The State Tradition in Turkey, 1985.
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5. Religion
During the period of transition from empire to nation state, Islam served
as a source of national unity against the invading foreign powers, the aim of the
Kemalist reforms after the victory was to free the politics entirely from religion.
They adopted a purely territorial and linguistic brand of nationalism.
Ataturk, unimpaired by a colonial heritage, refrained from placing the moral
responsibility for Turkish underdevelopment on Western nations.47 Thus, unlike
nationalism in Arab countries, Turkish nationalism is essentially secular and devoid
of any anti-Western component.
In spite of the secularization movement, Islam has always been present
in the individual and social life of a great majority of Turkish citizens. The aim of
Kemalist reforms was not, in fact, to eradicate religion from individual and social
life, but to achieve a complete separation of religion from political life. Between 1945
and 1980, some politicians used religion as a means of political mobilization. There
were attempts to politicize some religious groups. But these initiatives were clearly
motivated by reasons of power politics rather than by religious fervor, and there were
no politically organized attempts to repudiate the fundamental principles of
Ataturkism. There were political parties which were for the Islamic values, but
during the 1960 to late 1980s, they couldn't muster more than 12% of the votes, even
at their most favorable time.
47 Chipman, John, NATO's Southern Allies, 1988.
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This composition continued after the military intervention of 1980. Even
though there was some critics about Turkey's political future because of the possible
effects of Iranian Revolution, but that kind of ideologies couldn't find much
supporter in Turkey. With this secular type of government, but with the majority of
muslim population, Turkey continue to be a model country to other muslim
countries.
6. Terrorism
In Turkey, terrorism has developed as a multidimensional phenomenon.
It cannot be satisfactorily explained merely on the basis of sociological or economical
analysis. When terrorist activities began in Turkey in 1968, they were led by a mild
educational reform movement of university students, but they rapidly changed
character, escalating to violent clashes with the police and security forces.
Terrorism after 1975 became more widespread and destabilizing than it
had been during the 1968-72 period. Parallel to the terrorism in Turkey, acts of
violence by Armenian terrorists against Turkish targets abroad escalated. And
together with the economic problems, terrorism caused the military to intervene in
1980.
The total numbers of various arms captured from the terrorists after
September 1980 amounts to 800,000; the total value of such arsenal is estimated at
approximately 300 million dollars. Almost none of these weapons were manufactured
in Turkey. Profits from bank robberies by terrorist organizations can account for only
a very small fraction of their cost. Turkish authorities estimated total terrorist
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spending from 1977 to 1980 at one billion dollars. This is the equivalent of U.S. and
other NATO military aid to Turkey for the same period. 48 This fact constitutes
circumstantial evidence that terrorism against Turkey has been financed by external
powers with considerable interest in destabilizing the country. There were some
suspicion in Turkey about her neighbors. And Soviet, Bulgarian and Syrian roles,
moreover, have become quite clear from the confessions of captured terrorists.
Terrorism has complicated Turkey's relations with its allies. Terror inside
the country has not only posed a threat to Turkey's democratic stability and internal
security, but has also decreased her reliability as an ally. More importantly, it has
created indignation and frictions. While some allies have criticized Turkey's efforts
to check terrorist activities, they have also tolerated the free movement of Turkish
terrorist across international borders and within allied countries.
With the military intervention of 1980, terrorist activities sharply
disappeared in Turkey. But in mid-1980s, terrorist activities began in especially
Southeastern Turkey. And in late 1980, it was seen in big cities too. According to the
background of this activities and current reports, again external powers were
interested in Turkey's unity and security. Turkish leaders believe that this time,
again, terrorist organizations will be the losers.




In general, late modernizing states seem to have different
preoccupations and goals, and make difficult partners. In Turkey's case, successive
political parties have colored Turkey's foreign policy to some extent, causing
emphasis to shift from time to time, foreign affairs have always been treated as
national rather than party political matters. And Turkey's ambiguous geographical
and cultural situation makes difficult to determine the foreign policy.
In Turkey, foreign affairs always were over the political matters. For
example, in the 1940s, the President Inonu, before deciding to go ahead with the
introduction of multiparty democracy, was careful to receive assurances from the
incipient civilian opposition that the basic continuity of Turkish foreign policy would
not be challenged.
As in other late modernizing countries, the role of public opinion in
foreign policy is obtrusive, with press coverage of many topics being noisy and
emotional and acting as a major constraint on the government. This is particularly
the case where such issues as the Cyprus problem, disputes with Greece and relations
with Europe concerned. For the press, national prestige often appears to be a goal
in itself, with headlines focusing on foreign television programs, or irredentist maps,
or hostile remarks about Turkey.
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Despite its visibility, the role of public opinion is in some ways
narrower than in Western societies. Except among some extremist groups, the right
of the military to act as the ultimate arbiters of national interest is unquestioned.
Caution, based on awareness of limited resources, dominates Turkish
foreign policy. The bureaucratic and nationalist background of Turkish foreign policy
makers can be a disadvantage when dealing with public opinion and other
manifestations of the pluralist life of the West.49
The main objective in Turkey's foreign policy is the maintenance of
the state and its independence.A sense of encirclement by unfriendly neighbors, and
of proximity to an unstable and violent area, was always evident. So the principle
formulated by Ataturk "peace at home, peace abroad" became the cornerstone of
Turkey's conduct in external relations. This implied a policy based on the
maintenance of the status quo and on the survival of a relatively homogeneous
national state with clear Turkish identity, n line of with this thinking, Turkish leaders
considered security as a whole, and were concerned not only with regional problems
but also with security matters beyond their immediate environment.
In post war era, Turkish leaders pursued parallel policies which
described above. In early 1950s, Turkish government continued the foreign policy of
its predecessors in its entirety. Based on the recognition of Soviet imperialism a
danger number one, this policy aimed at consolidation of political links with the West
49 Barchard, David, Turkey and the West, 1985.
72
and improvement of Turkey's military and strategic position (by way of NATO,
European Council, EEC).
In conformity with these objectives, Turkey sought not only to
cultivate their friendship with the U.S. and other Western countries but also to
improve relations with their immediate neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle
East. Marshal Tito's defection from the Soviet camp and his veering toward the West
enabled Turkey to work for entente of free Balkan states as an additional barrier to
Soviet expansionism. Negotiations aiming at this objective resulted of a pact of
collaboration between Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece in 1953.
Unfortunately, this new spirit of friendship was not destined to last
long. With Yugoslavia turning back toward neutralism and the Cyprus issue dividing
Greece and Turkey, the usefulness of the Balkan Pact became highly questionable.
By the end of 1955 relations between Athens and Ankara had reached their lowest
point in the thirty five years following the Peace Settlement.
Greater success was Turkey's in her relations with the states in the
Middle East. She was anxious to secure her right flank by closer ties with Asian
countries threatened by Soviet expansion. Turkey spearheaded the action to bring
about an alliance of the Northern Tier states. This became the basis for a regional
alliance, to be known as the Baghdad Pact, which included Turkey, Britain, Pakistan,
Iran and Iraq.
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Although Turkey's accession to the Baghdad Pact ostensibly
strengthened her security, it also presented her with certain complications and
dangers. Indeed, Baghdad Pact was a part of the containment strategy.
But after a while, Turkey found herself suddenly facing the
Communist danger on both northern and southern borders because of the massive
economic, political, and cultural Soviet penetration of Syria. The fear of encirclement
led Turkish leaders to take certain diplomatic and military actions with an eye to
averting the danger to her security. In the diplomatic sector Turkish spokesmen
made a point of impressing upon Western public opinion the danger to the Free
World that the possible communization and satellization of Syria presented. Turkey's
anxiety about the trends in Syria was not ill-founded. The U.S. shared it to a
considerable extent. And Turkish-Syrian crisis was eventually overshadowed and
displaced by the movement for the unification of Syria with Egypt, which gained
momentum in the fall of 1957.
Another major issue claimed Turkey's attention between 1958 and
1960, namely, the problem of the future status of Cyprus. The London Agreement
was signed by the premiers of Turkey and Greece in 1960, who succeeded in putting
an end to a dispute which had plagued their relations ever since 1955 and had
threatened seriously to weaken NATO defenses in this part of the world.
In 1960s, the most general characterization that could be given to the
trends in Turkish foreign policy was that the government emphasized independence
and freedom of action. This meant a change in attitudes toward the Soviet Union as
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well as weakening of ties with the U.S. Beginning in 1964 when cabinet level visits
were exchanged between Ankara and Moscow, an era of normalization of relations
was inaugurated between the two countries. Preoccupied with other problems, the
Soviet leadership modified, at least outwardly, its earlier attitude of hostility toward
Turkey. Instead it began stressing peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation.
These political overtures were accompanied by concrete offers of
economic and technical assistance, some of which accepted. As a result a number of
Soviet technicians appeared in Turkey, an innovation contrasting strongly with the
mood of mutual hostility characteristic of the 1950s. As long as it suited Turkey's
needs, however, there was no reason for the Turkish leaders to reject any peaceful
Soviet manifestation and thus they responded positively to such overtures as did not
affect other basic ties and commitments to the West or to their neighbors in the
Middle east.
In the meantime, in 1964, at a conference in Istanbul, Turkey signed
an agreement with the Asian member of CENTO, Iran and Pakistan, establishing an
organization called Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). 50 But the
political and psychological purpose of RCD was to stress the independent regional
planning of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and to show Moscow that these three
countries were interested in mutual cooperation not necessarily for military purposes.
Magnus, R.H., Documents on the Middle East, 1969.
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Another major issue in 1960s, which affected the Turkish foreign
policy was 1962 Cuban missile crisis. It involved the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a
major diplomatic quarrel with possible implications of global war, indirectly
contributed to the weakening of American-Turkish ties. 51 American-Turkish
relations did not experience serious deterioration, however, until the Cyprus crisis,
which occurred in two installments, in 1964 and 1974, as we discussed earlier.
As the 1970s progressed, Turkey found herself facing fundamental
dilemmas in her internal politics and foreign policies. In the foreign sector Turkey's
main challenge was to rethink and reassess her international position both on the
regional scale and in regard to the two superpowers. On the regional scale, three
sectors could be distinguished; the northern Tier allies of Iran and Pakistan, the
Arab world, and her western neighbor Greece. Of the three sectors, the first two
appeared to pose no major problems. Because Turkey maintained a generally
friendly and cooperative relationship while not repudiating her diplomatic relations
with Israel. But relations with Greece suffered a great deterioration on account of
Cyprus and Aegean Sea.
Therefore the Cyprus crisis of 1974 forced Turkey to make a choice
between its perceived national interests and its relations with the U.S. and the West.
In the mid-1970s came attempts to set up new military industries and to devise a
more broadly based foreign policy. Actually this kind of policy was evident in early
51 Lenczowski, George, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, 1971.
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1970s. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Turkey refused to permit the U.S. access
to refuelling and reconnaissance facilities for an airlift to Israel. In 1976, Turkey
recognized the PLO and four years later Turkish government lowered its
representative level in Israel. These were, in a sense, an excuse herself of being the
first muslim country which recognized Israel.
In 1980s, Turkey continued to pursue its diversified foreign policy.
There was an deterioration in relations between Turkey and European countries
which stemmed from the military intervention of 1980. But Turkey was extremely
anxious to project a positive image to the West. Integration within Europe has always
been a major objective of Turkish policy. Especially with the Ozal government this
attempt accelerated, and on 14 April 1987 Turkey submitted formal application for
membership of the EC. Turkey resent playing a crucial role in NATO's southern
region while being denied the opportunity to participate in the process of European
political and economic cooperation. Turkish economic development, democratic
institutions, and human rights were likely to delay Turkey's accession into the EC.
Turkey has increased efforts to further cooperation in the Balkans
which is particularly welcome given the region's history of mutual antagonisms and
internecine warfare. But the Bulgarian treatment of ethnic Turkish minority
increased the tension between Turkey and Bulgaria.
Turkey was aware of the political and economic importance of the
Middle East. The need of oil and some security problems which stemmed from the
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separatist groups based in Iraq and Syria, led Turkish leaders to pay more attention
to their southern neighbors.
On the other hand, Turkey's economic relations with the U.S.and
Western countries increased. Especially Turkey's attempts to establish her own
defense industry attracted foreign investors. Turkey's policy became "more trade, not
more aid." Turkey was getting ready to compete, and also cooperate with other
powers.
As we said earlier, in international relations, not only external factors
but also internal factors can affect the decision makers. When we look at how
Turkey's domestic situation affected the decision makers we see the followings.
The 1950s initiated a rapid growth in the national economy,
characterized by the development of an industrial base that gave the private
entrepreneur a greater voice in national affairs. It emerged as a participant in, if not
a challenger to, the exclusive power of the politician and the bureaucrat. The
multiparty system, the press, the universities and the intellectuals emerged as
contentious participant in the formulation of foreign policy.
In the 1960s, the labor unions stepped into the fray. They began to
weigh heavily on economic policy, and since economic development depended on aid
and trade, the unions were inevitably pushed into the international arena.52
Furthermore, the one million Turks working in Western Europe created new
Eren, Nuri, Turkey, NATO and Europe: A Deteriorating Relationship,
1977.
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problems with the EEC over such basic issues as social security rights and free
circulation. During 1960s, foreign policy was also affected by the changes touching
the remotest corners of the Turkish countryside. Rising standard of living of Turkish
society was bounded to affect the country's national and international politics.
1970s also experienced the same kind of developments. The changes
in the domestic scene have broken the national consensus on foreign policy. The
injection of domestic concerns into the foreign affairs previously considered to be
dangerous and even traitorous to national interests, has generally accepted at this
period. Foreign affairs became top subject in election platforms. On the other hand
Turkey had coalition governments in 1970s. In the absence of a clear majority and
a strong government, Turkey couldn't make decisions or concessions on important
foreign affairs such as Cyprus issue.
In 1980s, Turkish society experienced a rapid transition period. It
became more open to international arena. The Ozal government with its majority
power, made bold decisions in national and international arena. Turkey became more
open to the international affairs. Interest groups affected the public opinion to make
their minds on foreign policy. Turkey's security and defense expenditures was
discussed publicly.
There is another point that we can talk about Turkey's foreign
policies. When we look at Turkey's overall relations, we see that Turkey's policies
doesn't change very quickly and unexpectedly. This can be explain in terms of big
states and small states or in terms the movement of mouse and elephant. In
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international relations big states' movements resemble the movements of elephant
and small states' movement resembles the movement of mouse. An elephant moves
slower than a mouse. This means a big or powerful state's policies change slower
than a small state. This is because of the power of the big state that it can affect
other states easily. In a sense it is a kind of organizational culture. In Turkey's case,
Turkey is not a big state with respect to the superpowers. But she keeps the culture
which comes from the Ottoman Empire. The feeling of being a big state and
determining certain policies for the benefit of itself and pursue those policies was
and is the main objective of Turkish leaders in international relations. So this unique
property also shaped Turkey's foreign policy. And this kind of foreign policy began
to increase Turkey's credibility and influence in the international arena. Some people
talked about Turkey as the potential regional power.
b. Soviet Union
Soviet-Turkish relations remained frozen until the 1960s. The
U.S.S.R. had sought normalization but Turkey had abstained. In a note of 30 May
1953, the Soviet Union withdrew the territorial claims of 1945 and considered
possible the provision of security of the U.S.S.R. from the side of the Straits on
conditions acceptable alike to the U.S.S.R. and to Turkey. 53 The cumbersome
language concerning the Straits didn't satisfy the Turkish government at that time.
Harris, George S., The Troubled Alliance, 1972.
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The first major break was expected with the exchange of visits
between Prime Minister Menderes and President Khrushchev, scheduled for July
1960. The need to tap new resources for economic assistance and an assessment that
American-Soviet relations could be entering a new phase were some of the reasons
behind the move.
Normalization of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union
moved forward steadily after the clash with the U.S. over Cyprus in the summer of
1964. Normalization relied on three main instruments: high-level official visits;explicit
agreement on the basic principle of international law on state independence and
sovereignty and on the principle of peaceful co-existence between two different social
systems; and Soviet economic assistance. The Soviet Union agreed to respect
Turkey's commitment to NATO, and the number of global issues on which there was
agreement increased with time. Both called for early end to the war in Vietnam, for
Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, for the strengthening of detente,
and for the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.
On the Cyprus question Turkey found the U.S.S.R. a major source
of support until 1974. The Turkish military intervention in 1974 and the fall of the
military regime in Athens, however, changed Turkey's favored position. Fearing
NATO control of the island, the Soviet Union joined UN calls for the dismantling
of foreign bases on Cyprus and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the island and
she proposed an international conference for a settlement.
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On the other hand, economic relations dominated the normalization
process for a long time. Soviet credits to Turkey were among the largest made
available to any developing country, which underscores the significance of Turkey in
Soviet estimations in general. 54 And restoration of confidence necessarily began with
better economic relations. In 1960s and 1970s several of the short-term objectives
have been achieved. The Declaration of the Principles of Good Neighborliness,
signed in April 1972, and the Political Document on the Principles of Good
Neighborly and Friendly Co-operation, drafted in 1975 and signed in June 1978, have
come to stand as proof that the level of mutual confidence achieved so far allows for
political as well as economic contacts.
Nearly fifteen years of official contacts, technical assistance and the
absence of intimidation led Prime Minister Ecevit to declare, on 15 May 1978 in
London, that the Soviet Union was not a threat to Turkey. Elaborating his statement
later, he explained that the Soviet Union had not shown any aggressive behavior
towards Turkey for years, which therefore resulted in the emergence of mutual
confidence between the two countries. 55
These good neighborhood relations continued in 1980s, and there
wasn't any major conflicts between two countries. Actually in late 1980s the Soviet
54 Larrabee, Stephen, Balkan Security, 1977.
Milliyet, Turkish newspaper, 15 September 1978.
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Union was dealing with its internal and Warsaw Pact problems. So, without any
conflicts, especially economic relations continued to improve.
c. Greece: Ally or Rival?
The Greek and Turkish peninsula share a strategic unity imposed by
the Aegean Sea. And in the postwar era, the Truman Doctrine led Turkey and
Greece to close cooperation. Their sense of common destiny was also enhanced by
the communist threat in Greece and by Soviet demands on Turkey. The extension
of the NATO to the Aegean sealed their bilateral relationship with a multilateral
engagement.
In the late 1950s, however, the Cyprus issue and later the dispute over
territorial waters and the continental shelf reflected unnatural and dangerous
strategic separatism in their perceptions of respective national interests in the
Aegean. These two major problems also have implications for both countries' extra-
regional relations. Historically, the diplomacy of European powers and now NATO
allies, has been governed by a tendency to juxtapose policies toward Turkey and
Greece.
Since the emergence of Cyprus as an independent state, the relations
of the U.S. with Turkey have been deeply affected by American concerns for Greece.
Many Turks fear that the Greek lobby in Washington has brought public sympathy
for greece to bear on U.S. positions on the Cypriot problem.
In addition to Cyprus issue, and territorial waters and continental
shelf problem in Aegean sea, militarization of the Aegean islands by Greece, the
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American aid which has to be pegged to a 7:10 ratio between Greece and Turkey,
minority problems, and unbelievable arms race between two allies, Turkey's Fourth
(Aegean) Army which was created in response to Greek moves to the Eastern
Aegean dominated the relations between Turkey and Greece in 1960s and 1970s.
Differences over the Aegean and Cyprus stem from a deep-rooted
Greek conviction that the jurisdiction of Greece extends over the entire Aegean Sea
and even over Cyprus, but that of Turkey does not go beyond its territorial waters.56
This perspective has inevitably led the Greeks to view any Turkish concern beyond
that line, such as the seabed delimitation or the rights of Turkish Cypriots, as an
aggressive attitude.
Turkey has no claims on any Greek territory; a fact which the Turkish
leaders has made clear on many occasions. Turkish governments have always
maintained the belief that both countries have interests in each other's welfare and
security. Accordingly, they welcome any improvement in U.S.-Greek defense
cooperation as a contribution to the strengthening of NATO's Southern Region. For
the same reason, in 1980, Turkey allowed Greece's return to the military
organization of NATO without reciprocal assurance that Ankara's conditions
concerning the application of the Rogers Plan and a final solution of the command
and control problems should be fulfilled by Athens. What Turkey cannot accept,
56 Chipman, John, NATO's Southern Allies, 1988.
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however, is the establishment of trilateral links between Turkey, Greece and the U.S.
on defense issues that are hostage to the specifics of the Greek-Turkish dispute.
In 1980s, the Turkish Government led by Ozal was cautious about
overstressing the disputes between Turkey and Greece. Turkish leaders believed that
the development of economic relations between Turkey and Greece would generate
an atmosphere of cooperation which would improve choices for dispute settlement.
To this affect, the Turkish government has abolished the visa requirement for Greeks
wanting to visit Turkey.
But in response, what the Greek government did was to claim that
the Turkish attempts were the main threat to Greece. On the other hand, Greece
became one of the main obstacles on the way to the full-membership of EC. These
two different approaches didn't solve the problems. And the Aegean crisis, in March
1987, has highlighted how easily and quickly the persisting tensions between Turkey
and Greece could lead to war between these two NATO allies. It also showed that
without the creation of a climate of mutual confidence in Cyprus and Aegean issues,
real peace in NATO's Southern Flank is far away. Another point in Turkish-Greek
relations is their common destiny. Up to the Greek's membership of EC both
countries did apply and became the members of European organizations such as
NATO, European Council. But Greek's membership of EC and later membership
of WEU split their common destiny. And now, Greece have more advantages than
Turkey in European affairs.
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d. Middle East
After the war, Arab nationalism, socialism and anti-westernism
developed strongly, at the same time as Turkey was seized by fear of the Soviet
Union. The national pre-occupations and central concerns of Turkey and the Arab
states were far apart, and specific points of difference soon emerged. For the Arabs
the conflict with Israel assumed the highest priority, while for Turkey defense
arrangements with the West seemed all important. Though Turkey had originally
opposed the partition of Palestine, she subsequently became the first Muslim country
to recognize Israel in 1949.
As already noted, Turkey further antagonized the radical Arabs when
she joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and because she sided with conservative Arab
forces in the 1950s, radical regimes like Egypt and Syria became the most virulent
critics of Turkey. The isolation in which Turkey found herself in 1964 over the
Cyprus question hurt most when she was snubbed by all the Arab countries except
Saudi Arabia.
Public opinion began to insist on establishing friendly ties with the
Arab states. This meant improving inter-state relations, a change of stand on the
Arab-Israeli conflict and distancing Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East from
that of the U.S. So, in the spring of 1967 Turkey declared that the American bases
could not be used in any conflict involving the Middle Eastern countries to dispel
Arab fears and memories of 1958 American intervention in Lebanon. The Arab-
Israeli War of 1967 encouraged Turkey to take an openly pro-Arab stand for the first
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time. Bilateral relations with the PLO were established in 1975. Turkey participated
in the first Islamic Conference in 1969 and its subsequent meetings.
Following the oil embargo in 1973, economic relations became the
focus of attention. The objectives were to secure the oil, if possible on easy payment
terms, to attract some of the new petrodollars for investment in Turkey, and to
increase exports to oil-producing Arab countries. Turkey share of trade with the
Middle East increased from about 9% in the mid-1960s to around 40% in mid-
1980s.57
Iran, Iraq and Syria have a special importance for Turkey. These
countries as neighbor also played important role for the security of Turkey. Iranian
revolution of 1979, and Syria and Iraq's support to some separatist groups against
Turkey affected the relations especially in 1980s. On the other hand Turkey's
mediator role in Iran-Iraq war was important issue in Turkey's relations towards
Middle East.
These developments simply indicated trends and possibilities.
Religious and cultural affinities have not yet provided a steady basis for cooperation,
despite Turkey's efforts to focus Arab attention on regional investment and trade.
Turkey also discovered that she has to stress the political factor instead of merely
concentrating on economic issues.




Since 1947 there was so much flux. In late 1980s, East-West and intra-NATO
relations were undergoing change precipitated by many factors but in particular the
process of reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The movement towards
democratization and the rejection of communism in Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Hungary and East Germany, and the more qualified rejection in Romania and
Bulgaria, have taken place with the acquiescence of President Gorbachev.
When combined with the on-going process of Arms Control, the unification of
Germany and the uncertain future of the Warsaw Pact, it appeared that the divisions
that have so dominated Europe, setting Alliance against Alliance, since the beginning
of the Cold War, were in the process of withering away in 1990.
On the other hand, in addition to concrete problem-Arab-Israeli conflict-
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 showed us the on-going uncertainties in
the Middle East. Former Soviet Republics which were gaining their independence,
became the center of the interests in the world politics. Finally, the Gulf War and
the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 were others steps on the way to
the New World Order which is led by the U.S.
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Therefore, the Russian danger has gone away, until and unless Russia
reassembles the economic strength, and the will to make another bid for the control
of Europe. And there is economic friction, and bad temper between the winners of
the cold war-America, Europe and Japan.58
Eastern Asia astonishingly contains both the last remnants of defeated Marxism
and the world's most efficient examples of victorious capitalism, but no great crisis
between them is in prospect; Eastern Asia's ideological wars were won and lost a
generation ago. Only a nuclear North Korea might make that untrue. Southern Asia
may have to live through an attempt by India to become the local superpower, but
the new world order can probably contain that. Latin America and Africa, after
communism and apartheid, at last have a chance to concentrate on their enormous
private business.
That leaves only one large stretch of the world notably liable to produce
turmoil and mayhem on a large scale in the coming 15-20 years; the appropriately
crescent-shaped piece of territory that starts in the steppes of Kazakhstan and curves
south and west through the Gulf and Suez to the north coast of Africa. This part of
the world and the Middle East are the potential zone of turbulence for a depressing
variety of reasons such as economic problems, undemocratic governments, security
of oil, territorial claims, etc.59
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Balkans is another scene that is full of ethnic conflicts and minority problems.
The on-going civil war in Yugoslavia shows the danger for the security and stability
in Europe. The problems of this sort of world are likely to cause difficulties for the
democracies of Europe and America. What about Turkey? If we look at the world
map and analyze the developments, we see that Turkey sits at the center of the
possible next cold war.
B. THE FUTURE OF NATO
The world today, particularly Europe, is to be sharply contrasted to the period
of the cold war when two alliances faced each other across a divided Europe with the
ever-present possibility of war by accident if not by design. It would be impossible
in these dramatically transformed times to expect NATO to remain unchanged. It
must be pointed out that many of the changes in Europe would not have taken place
without it.
Actually NATO began to transform itself a few years ago. With the events in
Eastern Europe and The Soviet Union moving so quickly, the London Summit of 5-6
July 1990 produced the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic
Alliance." And later on 7-8 November 1991 in Rome, the Alliance's new strategic
concept was agreed by the Heads of State and Governments of NATO countries.60
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Press Communique S-l(91)85, 7
November 1991.
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However, there are many debates about the future of NATO. But the most
likely solution for the new role of NATO, which is in implementation now, can be
explained in three categories:
• New strategic concept,
• Relations with Central and Eastern Europe, and
• Reinforcement of the European pillar within the alliance.
1. New Strategic Concept
According to the new strategic concept accepted at Rome meeting in
November 1991, the political division of Europe that was the source of the military
confrontation of the cold war period has been overcome. But the new environment
does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather
underlines their enduring validity. On the other hand, the changed environment
offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad
approach to security. This means that the East is not the only threat, but other
political, economic and military uncertainties that might cause new regional conflicts
and affect the interests and security of NATO countries. And the most likely regions
are the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East.
Some Middle Eastern countries with their developed weapons and
unstable governments are possible source of future conflicts in the region. They may
threaten the NATO security with their long-range and powerful weapons, or the
security of oil that the West needs may be in danger because of these conflicts.
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Because the West believes that an effort to cut the oil lifeline of Western Europe is
as great a threat to the security of NATO as a military attack against a NATO
member.61
While European defense remains NATO's core mission, so-called out-of-
area security cooperation may soon become the cutting edge of NATO's mission.
According to the people who argue for this new role of NATO, to cope with these
problems, NATO must have the capacity to reconstruct its defense as new risks arise,
using the enhanced warning time that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central
and Eastern Europe has created. In the Europe of tomorrow, military forces will be
less part and parcel of a combat strategy designed principally for the ultimate
eventually of all-out war than instruments of crisis prevention and crisis management.
The Alliance's ability to respond to strategic surprise will be critical.
People who stand for these ideas also suggest that in a more peaceful
Europe the integration of NATO forces is still necessary. Because multi-national
units will demonstrate the alliance's solidarity and resolve, even at reduced levels.
Integration will also be essential if NATO is to preserve the capacity to respond
quickly to new risks with well-trained, well-equipped forces.
For this new concept, the Gulf War was a good exercise. Even though
there were many non-NATO forces, the outcomes of the crisis and war were
successful. An integrated alliance force could bring even more successful results.
61 Nixon, Richard, "Is America a Part of Europe?" National Review, 2
March 1992.
92
2. Relations with Central and Eastern Europe
These countries wish to form closer ties with NATO. Indeed, the Alliance
took the lead at its London Summit in 1990 by inviting them to establish diplomatic
liaison with NATO headquarters, and in early 1992 it was accomplished.62
This is not a seeking for the shift of balance or an extension of military
borders to the East. But NATO wants them to be constructive partners with an
important contribution to make a more cooperatively conceived security equation in
Europe. This attempt will make Europe more secure.
3. Reinforcement of the European Pillar Within the Alliance
This is a concept that has been talked about for a long time, practically
since the inception of the alliance. Now, however, two powerful forces make its
creation an urgent necessity; there is the prospect of a significant reduction in U.S.
stationed forces in Europe which will shift a greater defense burden on to the
shoulders of the European allies; and there is the prospect of a European political
union which will also lead to a security and most likely even defense identity.
At this point let's look at what the powerful NATO members think about
this. The U.S. is planning to reduce its defense expenditures. Reduced U.S. forces
will help this decision. On the other hand, the U.S. doesn't want to relinquish its
leadership in the world politics. NATO was a good instrument to do this. In a way
it was the only important tie between the U.S. and Europe, and it provided U.S
62 Jane's NATO Handbook, 1991/1992.
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presence in Europe for years. To dissolve the NATO and go back home is not what
the U.S. leaders want. The Americans want Europeans to do more in their own
defense but not in competition with NATO.
France favors building an independent European force to serve a future
independent European foreign, security and defense policy. Germany also favors
common European policies in these areas, but thinks they can be had without
undermining NATO. Hence its recent joint initiative with France setting out the goal
of a common European defense policy, centered on the Western European Union
(WEU), which works in association with NATO. To Germany this is a way to bring
France closer militarily to NATO.
To Britain, which is deeply skeptical of a common European defense
policy and is determined to keep America in Europe, the Franco-German idea is a
threat to NATO's foundations. Unlike France and Germany, which see the WEU as
the future defense arm of the EC in association with NATO, Britain and Italy have
proposed that the WEU in effect becomes the European pillar of NATO in
association with the EC. 63
As we see, several different approaches to the European pillar have
emerged. But the most probable outcome is the use of the WEU as a bridge between
NATO and the EC, at least in the short term. By way of this, NATO will be kept as
the principal form for the determination of Western security policy, and non-EC
63
"NATO: Life After Threat," The Economist, 2 November 1991.
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countries (such as Turkey) will be involved in the decision making of future
European security and defense identity.
The Alliance will also continue to adapt over time to reflect the role of
a European security and defense identity, as it emerges, within its own structures.
For instance, the multi-national units and Rapid Reaction Force that NATO will
create, according to its new strategic concept, will not only enhance the European
contribution to the alliance but also allow the process of European integration to
play a greater role. It is essential that those U.S. forces remaining in Europe not be
excluded from these units. So, the connection between WEU and NATO will ensure
this.
As a result, this solution will preserve NATO's current integrated
structure with its transatlantic dimension in the defense of its members' territory, and
also enhances Europe's solidarity and actual military capabilities to act out-of-area
in defense of common alliance interests. And the alliance's version will be a new
Europe whole and free with a future European architecture based on four principal
constituent parts; NATO, EC/WEU, CSCE and Council of Europe.
C. THE CHANGING THREAT TO WESTERN SECURITY
The last few years have been seen by many observers as the period when peace
broke out throughout the world. Closer examination of world events, however, clearly
shows this was not the case and that the security of the West is still threatened,
albeit in different ways.
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According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
major armed conflicts were being waged in 32 locations in the world during 1989.
SIPRI defines a major armed conflict controversially as "a prolonged combat between
the military forces of two or more governments or of one government and an
organized opposition force, including the use of manufactured weapons and incurring
battle-related deaths of at least 1000 persons."64
A more concise definition is the one used by Paul Wilkinson and the Institute
for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, in London, as it excludes conflicts that are
predominantly "terrorist." According to their definition there were 18 conflicts being
waged throughout the world, mostly Third World countries, in civil wars, guerilla
wars and other violence.
Terrorism persists in at least three NATO countries on a more or less
permanent basis; the U.K. (IRA), Spain (ETA), and in Turkey (PKK). However,
other countries have also suffered from international terrorism, particularly that
which is generated from the Middle East. And countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya
were always at the top of the list which shows the countries that supported the
terrorist activities actively. These kind of countries can always also threat the security
of Middle Eastern oil. On the other hand, the end of Super Power rivalries or
confrontations throughout the world will not necessarily diminish wars, though the
ability of some local dictators in the Middle East to use leverage to draw in Super
64
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Power arms and support to underpin the regime will sharply decrease. So, great
efforts will be required in this area of increased cooperation to prevent local and
regional crises, and if that fails, to stop them spreading.
Because these unstable governments and powerful military forces are possible
actors for the conflict in the Middle East. So, the Middle East remains area of
continuing Alliance interest. These are why the Western alliance accepted its new
strategic concept (which accepts out-of-area threats and interventions) that gives
them the capability of intervention in the Middle East.
D. TURKEY IN THIS NEW ENVIRONMENT
1. General View
Many people thought that the end of the cold war made Turkey matter
even less than previously. The Turks were mildly useful in the "containment strategy"
and the defeat of communism. But that has been achieved, so the Turks can now
return to the periphery where they belong. This viewpoint is culturally arrogant and
geopolitically blind. 65
To understand why Turkey matters so much, even today, one must start
by looking at a map. Turkey has a strange collection of neighbors-the former Soviet
Union (or Commonwealth Countries), Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece and Bulgaria. Just
as that role (mentioned earlier) seemed to be diminishing to insignificance, along
with the Soviet threat, Iraq obligingly gave Turkey the chance to prove how useful
"A Survey of Turkey," The Economist, 14 December 1991.
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useful they could be to the defense of the West. Later possible roles and influences
of Turkey on the Central Asian Republics, which are mostly Turkish originated and
muslim, especially in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, made Turkey more important
in world politics. In addition to these, Turkish and muslim minorities in Balkans are
also looking for Turkey's recognition and help.
On the other hand, continuing relations with both European countries and
the Middle East countries made Turkey's another role, being a bridge between
Europe and the muslim world, to become sound.
2. Turkey and Her External Environment
As we noted earlier, following the advances toward Super power nuclear
parity and re-emergence of specific regional problems such as Cyprus, Turkey has
placed a greater emphasis on pursuing a broader conception of security. NATO's
neglect of the Southern Region and a growing perception that the Alliance was not
fully aware of Turkey's particular security problems encouraged the trend towards
strengthening Turkey's regional defense interests.
Turkish security and foreign policy has undoubtedly evolved to take a far
greater account of regional considerations and the development of political,
economic and diplomatic relations with her Middle Eastern neighbors. Conscious of
the endemic instability of the Middle East, Turkey has worked assiduously to secure
peace in the region. For example, she played a mediator role in Iran-Iraq War, and
remained neutral during the war despite violations of her airspace and territory by
both countries.
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However, the Iran-Iraq War highlighted one of Turkey's enduring
problems, namely the establishment of closer relations with Middle Eastern states
without becoming embroiled in regional conflicts or heightening Western anxieties
of an Islamic resurgence.
a. Relations with EC
Turkish efforts to promote diplomatic, environmental and economic
initiatives in the Middle East forms only one element of Turkish foreign policy. A
central objective of Turkish foreign policy remains EC membership and an integral
part of the application process has entailed the projection of a positive image in the
West.
The European Commission has decided that negotiations on Turkish
membership of the EC should not commence before 1993 suggesting that Turkey's
present economic, political and social standards were incompatible with those of the
EC. It s by no means certain that Turkey's application for membership of the EC will
be secured by her stance against Iraq as issues such as Cyprus, relations with Greece
(EC member Greece's positive response is necessary for Turkey's membership),
human rights and the state of the economy could all have a bearing on the final
decision.
b. Relations with the US.
Turkey remains at the margins of the process towards European
integration but relations with the U.S.have improved dramatically especially as a
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result of the Gulf Crisis. U.S.-Turkish relations were already improving even prior
to the outbreak of the Gulf War. The shelving of a Senate resolution to designate
24 April as a national day of remembrance for the Armenians was particularly
significant in this process. Temporary restrictions were imposed on U.S. military
activities in Turkey after the resolution cleared the Senate judiciary committee in
October 1989.
However, the U.S. has remained the major supplier of security
assistance to Turkey and aid levels were increased in the early 1980s. During the
mid-1980s assistance levels were drastically reduced but since 1988 an improvement
in the composition of security assistance was apparent as the grant portion of
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) began to increase against the share of FMS credits. In
FY91 Turkey received $500 million in FMS grants, none as credits, $50 million in
Economic Support Fund (ESF) and $3.4 million from the Military Assistance
Program (MAP). Turkey remains the third largest recipient of U.S. aid package.
In September 1990, the Turkish Government decided to extend the
Defense and Economic Agreement (DECA). The decision to extend the DECA in
conjunction with the extensive Turkish support for the allied forces in the Gulf has
been reflected in an increase in security assistance. In FY91, Turkey received a
supplemental $200 million in ESF. In FY92 Turkey will receive $625 million in FMS
grants, $75 million ESF and $3.5 million in International Military Education and
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Training. It is also evident that the maintenance of a fixed 10 to 7 ratio in U.S. aid
to Turkey and Greece is under review.66
c. Relations with the former Soviet Union
In addition to the improvement in U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkey has
intensified its economic, political and diplomatic contacts with the former U.S.S.R.
Turkey and her NATO allies now face the challenge of dealing with the independent
republics emerging from the former Soviet Union.
Since 1987 Soviet-Turkish trade more than tripled to $1.8 billion in
1990. During President Ozal's visit to Moscow in March, 1991, to sign a new
bilateral, cooperation agreement, negotiations concentrated on a wide range of joint
ventures in banking, telecommunications and agriculture. Notwithstanding these
advances, Turkey was acutely aware of the potentially destabilizing consequences of
the U.S.S.R. And now Turkey is dealing with a number of independent republics
emanating from the breakup of the U.S.S.R., because the population of the Central
Asian Republics has close ethnic affinities with Turkey, and exceed 40 million.
This will bring certain advantages but also it raises a number potential
problems. This area seems to be a potential market for Turkish goods. Also
improved diplomatic relations will increase Turkey's power among these republics.
But this developments fears the West and Western countries are getting anxious
about emerging a possible pan-Turkism. Actually Turkey doesn't have an intention
66 Jane 's NATO Handbook, 199 1/1992.
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in that way. But it becomes an alternative in Turkish foreign relations and makes
Turkey more powerful in world politics. For example, in Azerbaijan-Armenia
conflict, Turkey pursued an active policy and this increased her influences on the
Turkic republics. But this kind of developments are also a potential risk for Turkey
to be involved any local and regional conflicts.
On the other hand, Turkey has also proposed the establishment of a
Black Sea economic cooperation zone which could include the Caucasian Republics,
Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria. This organization is another tool which
gives Turkey economic and political advantages.
However, Turkey is still anxious about the developments in Russia
which is dealing with her internal problems. Turkey's fears stem from the possible
Russian nationalism and czarist policy that can wake again after the solution to her
domestic problems like the U.S.S.R. did in interwar and postwar periods.
d. Relations with the Middle East
The Middle East is one of the important area in the Turkish foreign
and security policies. Especially her Middle Eastern neighbors have the priorities in
these relations. During the 1980s, economic and diplomatic relations increased
dramatically. But Turkey's problems in the region have not been resolved following
the conclusion of the Gulf War.
After the mediator role in the Iran-Iraq War, in the early stages of
the Gulf Crisis, Turkey decided to block Iraq's main export pipeline across its
southern territory. Turkey was dependent on the closed pipeline for 50 percent of
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her oil imports for domestic use. On the other hand Turkey lost an estimated $1
billion in annual exports to Kuwait and Iraq. This was compounded by further losses
in the building, transportation and tourist industries. The burden shouldered by the
Turkish economy as a consequence of the sanctions is between $7 to 10 billion.67
In addition to the economic losses, Turkey's security was also
affected. The authority vacuum in Northern Iraq and later Iraqi President Saddam's
support to the terrorist organization PKK, increased the terrorist actions against
Turkish territory. The Turkish Government took some political, economic and
military measures against these activities. Especially military measures have been
criticized by the Western countries in terms of the human rights. While the same
measures were taken against the IRA in the U.K. and ETA in Spain, western
countries continue to criticize Turkey, some countries, even though they are NATO
members, support the PKK action which is directly a threat Turkey's security and
unity. But Turkey was and is very sensitive regarding her unity and experienced the
damage of terrorism in pre- 1980. So the Turkish Government continues to take the
measures necessary for her security even though these kind of actions decline her
credibility in the West.
While these developments damage the relations with Iraq, the same
issues are also evident for Syria and Iran. The PKK also receive support from the




between Turkey and Syria. Turkey has also concern that Iran could seek to exploit
the PKK campaign as a means of promoting Islamic fundamentalism within Turkey.
While Turkey continues to maintain economic relations with Iran and
improve the relations within the Regional Development Organization (RCD),
environmental and economic issues could lead to further deterioration in relations
with Iraq and Syria. Both Iraq and Syria are dependent on Turkey's Greater
Anatolian Project (GAP), a complex of dams that will harness the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers to provide irrigation and power to an underdeveloped region and
will make doubled Turkey's agricultural production.
Turkey did open the gates of two diversion tunnels in her giant
Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates river on February 1990. This released 500 cubic
meters of water per second across its southern border to Iraq and Syria downstream.
Iraq and Syria had pressed for a reduction in the filling period to reduce the damage
to their economies and despite the diversion of the water, the issue remains a source
of contention. Although Turkish officials have explained that this project will not be
used as political and military pressure tools, Iraqi and Syrian officials are anxious
about the developments in Turkey.
On the other hand these countries' large amount of military
expenditures is another reason why Turkish leaders are interested in with these
countries closely. Unexpected crisis may cause big losses in the region because of the
large amount of weapons.
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e. Relations with the Balkans
The Turkish Government has made strenuous efforts to initiate
regional cooperation in the Balkans. Stability in the Balkans remains an unlikely
prospect given the apparent disintegration of Yugoslavia, the growth of opposition
in Albania, enduring problems in Turkish-Greek relations, however improving
friendship in Turkish-Bulgarian relations.
The two NATO allies were on the verge of hostilities in March 1987,
over disputed oil resources in the Aegean. Conflict was averted and the Davos
initiative of winter 1988 seemed to herald a new era in Turkish-Greek relations.
Despite some advances, both sides failed to deal with issues of substance and they
even differ on what is negotiable.
While NATO's defense in the Eastern Mediterranean weakens
because of the conflicts between these two countries, the Cyprus issue continues to
plague Turkish-Greek relations. Greece uses the Cyprus and Aegean problems as an
obstacle to Turkey's relationship with the West. Greece doesn't lift her veto to EC
membership of Turkey. But Turkey had lifted a similar veto while Greece was
returning to NATO's military part. Now the Turkish leaders remember the necessity
of long-term decision making and how the strategic decisions must be made.
Turkey's relations with her Balkan neighbor, Bulgaria, have followed
a similar pattern dominated by mutual animosity. Relations between the two nations
have been characterized by an intense historical rivalry pre-dating the postwar
division of Europe. Bulgarian treatment of the ethnic Turkish minority which
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comprises about 10 percent of the population soured relations during the 1980s. In
June 1989, thousands of ethnic Turks left Bulgaria following an intensification of
Bulgarianisation policies.
The forced resignation of Zhivkov, the liberalization of the
Communist Party and the progress made towards democracy in Bulgaria, have all
served to improve bilateral relations. Recently, high level of military and other
official visits were exchanged. And friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria
continues to improve.
On-going disintegration in Yugoslavia is another interest area for
Turkey because of the muslim and Turkish minorities. Turkey recognized all new
independent republics and pursue an active policy to keep her influence in the
region.
3. Turkey's Domestic Scene
Turkey, today, is a working democracy. According to the West, Turkey is
still weak in the civil rights department but the election on October 20th, 1991,
showed that multi-party choice is vigorously back in operation, and the chances of
another military intervention are small and diminishing.
Turkey also has a fairly promising economy. Despite the electoral
economic policies in the late 1980s and the effects of Gulf War, her national income
is growing cheeringly faster than her population, and since 1980 the Turks have
abandoned their old fascination with economic self-sufficiency and the merits of
state-run industry. There is now a bad case of inflation and too many dead-loss state
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companies. Actually the new economics of 1980s did end the old autarky. Exports
went up briskly with the depreciation of the Turkish lira and export subsidies; so did
imports,as quotas were abolished and tariffs slashed. Foreign investment rose as
controls were loosened.
Partly because of the state's chunk lost so much money, the budget deficit
grew and grew after the mid-1980s. Although the economy also grew—by 4.6% a year
on average through the 1980s, twice the population growth-this failed to do much
for Turkey's high unemployment, even though real wages fell sharply. Worst 1980s
never really got a grip on Turkey's frightening inflation.68
Disappointed that the 1980s did not produce a complete cure, some Turks
are now looking in an other direction. While debates are going on EC membership,
its advantages and disadvantages, Turkey's economy is getting ready to turn to her
racial and religious friends. But the break-up of the Soviet Union offers the Turks
no general alternative to what they set out to do in 1980s. Either Turkey makes her
economy properly competitive, or Turkey sinks back permanently into the world's
third division.
On the other hand, Turkey's political structure is different from the 1980s.
With the abolishment of the laws which ban the religious and communist parties,
Turkish political life became more diversified. People and press began to talk about
every subject. For example, the downsizing of the Turkish Armed Forces and the
"A Survey of Turkey," The Economist, 14 December 1991.
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defense expenditures became popular subjects. However, a coalition governmentwas
the result of the last election on October 20th, 1991. It has two different meanings.
It was proof of a low chance of military intervention, and a working multi-party
system. Because Turkish politicians managed to change the government by election.
But for some people it was a sign of weak coalition governments in the late 1970s.
So far the new government is doing well on the subjects that are critised by the West
such as human rights.
Another issue, terrorism is also makes people to remember the days full
of unstabilities and uncertainties in the 1970s, even though these terrorist activities
are different than the pre- 1980s. This situation also decreases Turkey's credibility in
the international arena. But Turkey experienced these events before. So Turkish
leaders are aware of the risks and disadvantages of these threats. What they have to
do is to analyze the past and present situation and select the best alternatives.
E. TURKEY'S CHANGING ROLE IN NATO
During the cold war period, Turkey's contribution to NATO has been on the
size of its armed forces, the second largest in the Alliance, and the provision of vital
bases and logistical support. Turkey's role in NATO has largely centered on attempts
to contain Warsaw Pact forces in the Southern Region and prevent unimpeded
Soviet access to the Mediterranean through control of the Turkish Straits.
Given the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact scenarios involving an assault on the
Turkish Straits are no longer credible but the importance of the Southern Region
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could well increase as NATO's strategy is no longer predicated on the need for a
massive concentration of forces in central Europe. Turmoil in the Middle East and
Balkans directly impinges on the security of the Southern Region and Turkey may
be one of the NATO countries most directly affected by sources of instability
emanating from the new international order.
It used to be said that Turkey's value to the West was purely military. But it
was not true. Because Turkey could do little during the cold war to help hold off the
Soviets on the vital central front, in Germany. Turkey could offer vital bases or divert
the Soviet forces or be physical obstacle to Russian access to the Middle East.
Maybe because of this, western NATO members didn't care about the Southern
Region Countries' military strength and armed forces' modernization.
When we look at the new strategic concept of NATO, we see that new threats
are expected from regional conflicts. And the Middle East is the most likely source
of threat for the Western countries. This means NATO's vital central front is shifting
from Germany to the Southern Region. Turkey, as the only NATO country
bordering with the Middle Eastern Countries, is going to be the central front.
Therefore Turkey's importance for NATO will increase. Theoretically this is true.
But in reality, past experiences show that the West will remember Turkey only in
case of any threat to the West, at that time Turkey will be an important front. If the
threat comes to only Turkey from the South, the West may not react properly, or
they may evaluate it as not a real threat.
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On the other hand, according to the present assumptions, Turkey is still
important for the West. Hence, NATO countries must increase their military and
economic aid to Turkey to keep the central front strong. But, the developments are
not that way. When we look at the new arrangements in Europe, EC member
countries are aiming at a whole and free Europe. They have every kind of institution,
including defense organization WEU, to accomplish this. Then what is the use of
NATO among this organizations? It seems NATO's role here is temporary, because
WEU/EC members are still in a transition period. Their defense capabilities and
organizations are not organized to cope with out-of-area conflicts which are critical
for the West, such as the security of the Middle Eastern oil.
For the U.S., NATO is essential to the U.S. presence in Europe. In case of any
out-of-area intervention, the U.S. forces will be the main element. Since the U.S. is
a non-WEU member, she can't join the defense forces of Europe theoretically. So,
NATO will be necessary to keep the U.S in Europe, and get her help for the out-of-
area interventions, at least in the short run. When the EC/WEU become self-
sufficient, new arrangements can be made.
As we see, for the time being NATO is still important for the interests of the
West. Until WEU becomes a powerful military organization, NATO will defend its
interests in out-of-area threats. It is more beneficial for the EC members not to
dissolve NATO rather than increasing the number of the EC members. This means
they will decide whether there is a threat to the West. Non-EC members of NATO,
will not have more effects in these arguments. So Turkey's importance will increase
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or the West will remember Turkey only in case of any threat from the Middle East
to the West.
So, Turkey can't be an important NATO member unless she becomes an EC
member. But there are many obstacles for this membership. The first one is that
Turkey's economic and democratic situations are not at the same level with the West.
On the other hand, Turkey's military capabilities and modernization level of her
armed forces are also not at the same level with the other NATO members. If we
follow the same logic, Turkey cannot be a NATO member, because to do the given
duties, she must be at the level of NATO standards.
This simple explanation shows the two faces of the West. But Turkey believes
that this kind of organization requires mutual confidence between the members.
Each member must respect each others' rights and security, and each others' needs.
But this was not the case in NATO. Turkey will always remember the Cyprus affairs.
On the other hand, these kind of events continue to occur. For example, in early
1992 the relations between Turkey and Germany deteriorated, because Germany
didn't accept the PKK actions as terrorist actions and criticized Turkey because of
her measures against this terrorist organization, and cut the military aid.
This also raises the question of who will decide whether there is a threat to any
member. In reality, only a country herself can analyze her situation and decide
whether there is a threat or not. After this, other members must respect to this
decision and support her actions.
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However, since Turkey experienced these kind of events, she has attempted to
increase her military capabilities by her own defense industry. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, Turkey began modernizing her armed forces. While Turkey's security
policy continues to be based on NATO, with a foreign debt of $49 billion and an
inflation rate of around 60 percent, Turkey faces a severe challenge in seeking to
modernize its armed forces.69 But it was during the last decade that a major drive
was launched to create a viable indigenous defense industry. This process was
designed to alleviate the burden on the defense budget by increasing military exports
and also to reduce Turkey's dependence on foreign security assistance.
As a consequences of this policy, Turkey will have a chance to decide on her
own foreign and security policies, which will provide her freedom in her actions in
the world politics. It will help Turkish Government to be ready for any unexpected
deteriorations in the relations between Turkey and her NATO ally.
F. THE CHANGING THREAT TO TURKEY
The analysis of the new environment shows that the Soviet threat to Turkey
also has ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Actually, as noted earlier,
Turkey has claimed in late 1970s that the Soviet Union was not a threat anymore to
Turkey. It is now accepted by all countries too.
This doesn't mean that Turkey does not have any more security problems. In
addition to the explanations related with the developments in Europe, Balkans,
69 Jane's NATO Handbook, 1991/1992.
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Central Asia and Middle East, if we look at the strange neighbors of Turkey, we will
see that Turkey is at the center of many current conflicts. All of them have
different importance for Turkey.
While the Turkish-Bulgarian relations are improving, Turkish-Greek relations
keep its special place in the Turkish foreign and security policies.
But the developments in the Middle East are getting more important for
Turkey. Increasing military expenditures and unstable governments in the Middle
East makes Turkish leaders anxious about the possible conflicts in this region.
Especially her Middle Eastern neighbors Iraq, Syria and Iran are the countries
spending more money in weapons acquisition.
Also their support for the terrorist organization PKK's actions against Turkey,
makes Turkey more sensitive to the relations with these countries and force Turkey
to take into account these countries while planning her new security policy. These
terrorist actions are directly a threat to Turkey's unity and security, and to all
citizens' safety.
On the other hand, while Middle Eastern oil keeps its importance for all
countries, water is becoming another problem in the Middle East. According to
speculations, the next war in the Middle East will be for water. Turkey's neighbors,
Iraq and Syria, rely on Turkey, to provide water for their needs, because two
important rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, originate in Turkish territory. Also
Turkey is building large dams on these rivers according to her GAP project. This
project is increasing the tension between Turkey and her southern neighbors. So. a
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possible conflict due to water in the Middle East will likely involve Turkey too. This
is another example of possible threats to Turkey.
Actually Turkish officials claimed on several occasions that they don't have any
intention to use the water as a weapon, but there are still ongoing speculations.
President Ozal proposed a project called Peace Pipeline which will go from Turkey
all the way down to Saudi Arabia, to show Turkey's contribution to the peace in the
region. But so far there is no official agreement.
These developments require more emphasis on the Middle Eastern neighbors
of Turkey while Turkish decision makers making their security policies in the New
World Order.
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VI. NATO: A MISFIT?
A. THE STRATEGY EVALUATION
In strategy making process, it is very important to understand past and present
situations. Then you can decide which direction to go. In this paper, up to now, we
analyzed the past relations between Turkey and NATO, and environmental effects
on decision makers. Later we looked at the new environment and what kind of
future prospects there are today.
This overview of the past and present trends in Turkish security policy and thinking
should support the view that there is indeed very intimate linkages and
interdependencies between national policy, internal developments and the
international system.
As noted earlier, the main reason for the Turkey's membership of NATO was
to get political and military support against Soviet threats. Along with this goal, there
were also other goals such as to ensure the continuity of the aid which stem from the
Truman Doctrine, to get the political support for the establishment of democratic
institutions, and of course Turkey's wish to be a European country and considered
among the Western countries.
Turkey joined NATO after two years of lobbying for admittance, and an earlier
rebuff. After this, we saw that the firm political cooperation with the U.S. and
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Britain against the Soviet Union, together with NATO's military defense strategies,
decreased the Soviet pressures on Turkey. While the West's political and military
supports were going on, economic relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union
led to the improvement of the mutual confidence between Turkey and the Soviet
Union.
By the late 1970s, Turkey was claiming that there was no Soviet threat anymore
to Turkey. With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and the dissolving of
the Soviet Union on the last days of 1991, this threat has ended completely. This was
a success for Turkey and NATO. They accomplished the main goal of the NATO
defense organization. It also shows that Turkey's membership to NATO, and its
NATO based security policy was the right choice for Turkey in 1950s. This defense
strategy was consistent with the Turkey's security goal (the principle of consistency).
In terms of political, economic and military aid, we can say that was also
accomplished, although the error was not to determine specific goals; that is, to what
level Turkey's needs would be met by NATO. Since there wasn't any definite plan,
other members became developed countries but Turkey remains a developing
country which still needs external economic and military aids. Her armed forces feel
deeply the need for modernization.
To depend on allies' aid and accept what they could offer has slowed down
Turkey's development. On the other hand, there were conflicts and interruptions in
giving aid to Turkey, especially due to the Cyprus conflicts. Turkey experienced
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isolation in world politics, when even the ally countries left Turkey alone. These were
the inconsistencies in their NATO based strategy.
Another inconsistent policy stemmed from the NATO based strategy was
Turkey's Middle East policy. Turkey was sometimes forced or sometimes felt that she
had to pursue a parallel policy with the West in the Middle Eastern issues. But later
Turkey felt the necessity of diversifying her foreign policy and the Middle East took
a special place in her foreign policy.
A strategy must represent an adaptive response to the external environment
(the principle of consonance). In the cold war era, while Warsaw Pact was changing
its strategies against the West, NATO also tried to adapt its defense strategies by
taking into account the new Soviet strategies and new weapons systems. NATO as
an organization was successful in adapting to developments in its environments. But
we can not say that each member felt the same confidence.
In Turkey's case, during the early years of the membership of the alliance,
there was some unease at possible discrepancies between the all-out strategy to be
employed by NATO and Turkey's strategic requirements. Later also, the strategy of
flexible response caused particular disquiet among segments of Turkish public
opinion, since it could be taken to imply that large areas of the east of the country
might be sacrificed without a fight in time of war. So, new adaptive strategies or
matching the requirements of the environment was not a success from the
perspective of Turkey's needs.
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However, a strategy must provide for the creation and/or maintenance of a
competitive advantage in the selected area of activity (the principle of advantage).
From the perspective of Turkey, NATO as an integrated defense organization, could
offer to Turkey a high level of development in her domestic defense industry, since
NATO requires cooperation in defense.
But while other members were getting industrialized and modernized, they
neither cooperate with Turkey in production, nor transferred their technology to
Turkey. And Turkey is still in need of a domestic defense industry. In late 1970s and
1980s, there were Turkey's own attempts to establish defense industry after getting
lessons from the Cyprus conflicts.
On the other hand, a strategy's purpose is to provide structure to the
organization's goals and approaches to coping with its environment. It is up to
members to carry out the tasks defined by strategy. A strategy that requires tasks to
be accomplished which fall outside the realm of available or easily obtainable skills
and resources cannot be accepted. It is either infeasible or incomplete (the principle
of feasibility).
In the case of Turkey's NATO based strategy, Turkey's defense and her NATO
obligations were almost entirely based on her own armed forces against possible
Soviet attacks. But if we compare the Turkish Armed Forces with the Soviet's, we
can't expect Turkey to stand against the Soviet Union successfully in a war. Actually,
according to the NATO articles, if a member is attacked, the others will help her,
but since Turkey experienced the opposite developments (remember the Johnson's
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letter and arms embargo), to get that kind of help in case of danger for Turkey was
doubtful. Turkey cannot trust the ally countries completely in this. So, from the
defense perspective of Turkey against the Soviet Union by her armed forces, this
strategy was infeasible to Turkey.
Another goal of Turkey was being among the European countries. Since 1952
Turkey has played a full part in most Western and European international
institutions, from NATO to the OECD and to the Council of Europe. Through her
membership, Turkey was introduced to the circle of the American-West European
political and diplomatic partnership. NATO membership allowed for a continuous
and spontaneous exchange of views between Turkey and her collective allies. The
value of such diplomatic contacts in political, economic and cultural relations is
inestimable; more than anything else, it has enabled Turkey to establish herself as
a European power.
From Turkey's point of view, despite some psychological complications and
ambiguities, which were most freely ventilated in Turkey in the 1960s, when freedom
of discussion was at its greatest, involvement with the West would appear to have
brought a range of benefits. Contact with advanced industrial societies remains the
chief source of innovation and advance in Turkish society. So, Turkish people believe
that they got some benefits from these relations.
All in all, we can say that Turkey, by joining NATO, has eliminated its Soviet
threat, ensured the continuity of its aid (more or less), and enjoyed being among
Western powers. Even though there were some seemingly inconsistent policies, not
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being able to take some competitive advantages from the membership, and the
infeasibility of military defense against the Soviet Union, NATO has contributed to
Turkey's needs.
Now it is time to evaluate this strategy again according to the new environment
which was analyzed earlier. To adapt a strategy to a new environment, first of all, we
have to decide where to go, or what our goal is. For a defense strategy, the threat
should be understood to decide what our goal is.
From the explanations in chapter V, we can conclude that the threat to NATO
has changed since the communism and the Soviet Union has collapsed. Our analysis
shows that the threat to NATO has shifted from the East (U.S.S.R.) to the South
(Middle East). Actually there is no visible military threat from the Middle East to
the alliance. But present tensions and potential conflicts led the Western alliance to
take into account the Middle Eastern countries more seriously in the new strategic
concept.
There is no specific threat in the military sense, but the Middle East is more
dangerous than other regions due to the large amount of military expenditures of
these countries, and unstable governments which can affect the security of oil that
the West needs. So, this region is the highest on the list of threats to the West.
From the analysis, it is also obvious that the threat to Turkey is also from the
South. In today's Turkey, the most important security issue is the terrorist actions in
Southeastern Turkey. There are also some attempts to make these actions nation-
wide. Turkey experienced the terrorist activities in 1970s. But this time it is different.
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These actions have external supporters like the 1970s'. However, now Turkish
officials explain explicitly that the terrorist organization (PKK) is getting support
from Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors—Iran, Iraq and Syria.
We analyzed in chapter V why these countries pursue this kind of policy. And
also we saw how some ally countries (e.g. Germany) evaluate this situation. So, this
terrorist action backed by the external actors is the most important threat to Turkey's
security and unity today.
It seems that both NATO and Turkey expect the new threat from the South.
But the contents of the threats are different. While the South becomes a threat to
the West in case of any danger to the security of oil that the West needs or possible
terrorist action against Westerns, the South is a direct threat to Turkey today due
to these terrorist actions which may damage her security and unity.
For the West, the threat is a possible conflict, like the recent Gulf Crisis and
War. On the other hand, Turkey is experiencing this terrorist threat today. And some
NATO members don't accept this situation as a threat to Turkey like they didn't
accept in case of Cyprus conflicts. It means there is not much mutual confidence
between Turkey and ally countries. So in addition to these terrorist attacks, if there
will be limited war between Turkey and any neighbors, Turkey may not get help from
the alliance. The last forty years' experiences force Turkish leaders to think in this
way. Because of this there is a great Turkish effort to establish her own defense
industry, at least to be self-sufficient in some areas of this industry.
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As we see, there are different views and opinions at the beginning of the
formation of goals for a NATO based defense strategy between Turkey and ally
countries. This situation stems from the differences of the felt threats. Even if they
had a common threat, a NATO based strategy presented inconsistent policies for
Turkey and doesn't offer any advantage. So it would be a mistake to expect more
positive results for the benefits of Turkey from the NATO based strategy which has
to present suitable policies for different threats in this new environment.
Another point which will affect the formation of Turkey's security policy is
NATO's future role. From our analysis we see that it will have a temporary role in
the near future. Until the West becomes a self-sufficient power and ready to play a
super power role in the world politics, NATO will continue to serve. Since the West
is planning for its future years (a defense policy without NATO, but under the
control of EC/WEU) in a whole and free Europe, Turkish officials also must take
into account these further developments. Since Turkey is not a member of EC and
WEU, when the temporary role of NATO ends, Turkey will be out of European
security policy. This is further evidence that the West does not take into
considerations the felt threats to Turkey in this transition period. And as a result this
will produce a poor defense cooperation.
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B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED
To find out the answer of how the leadership of Turkey would decide whether
Turkey should stay in NATO or not first we analyzed the Turkey-NATO relations
in a historical perspective, and then we answered the subsidiary questions.
The question-why did Turkey join NATO, was answered in chapter II.
According to the analysis in this chapter Turkey was in need of external military,
political and economic support to cope with the Soviet threats and her internal
problems. So, NATO was the best alternative then according to the Turkish leaders.
Chapter III and IV give the answer of the question that how the membership
of Turkey affected Turkey and NATO during the post war period . According to
these explanations, Turkey and NATO was successful in eliminating the Soviet
threat. But Turkey couldn't meet all of her expectations. The principles of the
strategy evaluation also showed that except the elimination of the Soviet threat,
NATO based strategy didn't solve the Turkey's problems.
The analysis of the new environment in chapter V revealed the new threats to
Turkey and NATO, which is the answer of where does the primary threat to Turkey
and NATO come from now . According to this, both expect the new threat from the
South, but the contents of the threats are different. While any country in the Middle
East could be a threat to Western Alliance, Turkey expect the new threat from her
Middle Eastern neighbors--Iran,Iraq and Syria.
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Another subsidiary question was whether it is still favorable for Turkey to be
a NATO member . The analysis of the past and present environments, and future
prospects show that NATO couldn't meet all of the Turkey's needs. And NATO's
future role will be a temporary role on the way to the unification of Europe.
According to the current developments regarding to the unification of Europe,
Turkey doesn't have any place in this unification process. So Turkey cannot rely on
the NATO for her future security policies.
All these answers helped us to figure out whether Turkey should stay in NATO
or not and what Turkey should do . The answer of this primary question is as follows
in conclusion.
C. CONCLUSION
In short, while the Turkish case is now in question, the whole concept of the
viability of the NATO Alliance, as well as the concept of American protection of
Western Europe, is also in question. The Turkish case is the only one example of the
impact of changing conditions on Alliance credibility and cohesion.
The Turkish case is more complicated than the others, and local difficulties
greater because Turkey's dependence on the U.S. covers the whole spectrum from
economic to military matters, while the rest of Western Europe's dependence is
largely confined to the military guarantee. What makes the Turkish case unique and
points to the basic contradiction that is at the source of several of the major
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problems is the fact that Turkey is in reality a developing country yet is also closely
associated with the industrialized West.
However, Europeans have tended to emphasize economic, political and military
cooperation as alternative ways to ensure the security of Europe. And the
developments in the new environment show that this attempt will soon be real. So,
Turkey must consider these developments while planning new policies.
What is certainly true in Turkey's case is that there are problems of domestic
political stability and economic difficulties to be solved before security policy can be
redefined. Turkey must discover where she is going. Only then can she give
expression to a clear and logical security policy which derives from a confident
foreign policy and a sense of knowing where Turkey fits into the overall scheme of
things.
For the time being, it is not easy to cut all relations with NATO; and it is too
simplistic to suggest that Turkey's turn towards the Middle East and Central Asian
Republics is solely or even mainly a result of anti-Western sentiment. But the
Turkish leaders must take into considerations the temporary role of NATO for the
near future, and then plan the long range security policies. This will be also a
transition period for Turkey like other Western countries.
Turkey's future policies will be shaped by her models of development. Because
different models of development imply different alternatives for foreign and security
policy. Those who propose development along the present mixed-economy model
tend to see Turkey's ties with the West as a necessary element for Turkish security;
125
those who stress fundamentalist values propose a security structure based on Islamic
concepts of social and defense organizations. On the other hand a centrally-planned
economy for the development on the socialist model is not valid anymore for Turkey.
Finally, for those whose point of departure is Turkey's systemic under-development
Third-Worldism offers the only road to security by first guaranteeing economic
security. There are, of course, many subdivisions, combinations and domestic
alliances that blur the outlines of these basic alternatives.
In addition to these, a bilateral arrangement with the U.S or neutrality are
among the alternatives. And as we said, the type of development will affect the
selection. The future of the EC membership, the relations with the Central Asian
Republic which may offer Turkey large market, or the success of Regional
Development Organization are possible trends which will shape Turkey's future
policies, All these attempts are related with Turkey's economic stability. Once Turkey
gains it, it will be easier to determine the policies.
In general, despite the rapid and extensive changes in the security environment
in which Turkey must operate, Turkey will continue to seek security through ties with
NATO in the short run, and then the most economically profitable choice, which will



















































Source: The Strategy Process, Mintzberg, Henry arid Quinn, James B., 1991.
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Table la.
Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures

















































1970 811 1343 540 19230 31825 6589 35.7 4.2 204 37 15.1 891
1971 961 1545 610 22274 35074 8122 366 4.4 19.0 42 16.7 958
1072 1030 1559 610 24920 37666 7403 37.5 4.1 21.1 41 16.3 1005
1973 1092 1562 545 27747 39693 7866 365 30 19 9 40 14.2 1031
1974 1209 1580 535 32621 42637 7936 39.5 3.7 199 40 13.5 1079
1975 2175 2594 453 36592 46038 9956 40.5 5.6 25.1 64 11.2 1136
1976 2652 3010 460 43668 49565 11577 41.5 6 1 260 72 11.1 1194
1977 2755 2949 540 46152 51545 14204 42 2 5.7 20.8 69 12.7 1212
1978 2727 2727 566 53068 53068 14249 435 5.1 19.1 62 13.0 1220
1979 2511 2307 717 58172 53448 14923 446 4.3 155 51 16.1 1198
Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1970-1979,






























250 413 5 6 948 1568 568 073 263 09
1971 260 409 1171 1643 677 1066 222 00
1972 150 226 10 15 1563 2363 885 1338 9.5 1.1
1973 SO 71 10 14 2066 2984 1317 1884 2.3 0.8
1974 150 196 3778 4037 1532 2002 3.0 0.0
1B75 220 262 5 6 4730 5653 1401 1671 4.6 04
1976 320 363 10 11 5120 5821 1060 2224 6.2 0.5
1977 140 149 S796 6204 1753 1676 24 0.0
1978 220 220 10 10 4600 4600 2288 2288 4.7 0.4
1979 210 192 10 9 5070 4658 2261 2077 4 1 0.4
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (yearly publications)
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Table lb.
Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures



















































1977 1494 2612 771 24710 44960 12580 424 5.6 208 62 18.2 1060
1976 1465 2419 721 28340 46170 12640 43.3 52 191 56 16.6 1066
1979 1333 1996 696 30380 45500 13560 44.2 4.4 14.7 45 15.8 1029
1960 1566 2153 717 32750 44960 11640 45.1 4.8 18.2 48 15.9 996
1961 1666 2337 741 37260 46690 11670 462 5.0 20.0 51 16.0 1011
1982 2221 2613 769 41550 46890 12110 4703 5.3 21.6 55 16.3 1034
1963 2223 2516 824 44720 50660 12630 464 5.0 19.9 52 17.0 1047
1964 2227 2432 815 49040 53560 13820 49 5 4.5 17.6 49 16.5 1082
1985 2446 2597 814 53250 56480 14460 507 4.6 17.9 51 16.1 1115
1987 2690 2690 879 65460 65460 14920 530 4 4 19.4 55 16.6 1235
Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1977-1987,





























1977 140 245 5796 10140 1753 3066 2.4
1978 220 356 10 16 4599 7493 2266 3728 4.8 0.4
1979 170 256 10 15 5069 7592 2261 3386 3.4 0.4
1960 300 412 10 14 7909 10660 2910 3995 38 0.3
1961 310 366 10 13 8933 11190 4703 5690 35 02
1962 450 530 20 24 8643 10410 5746 6761 5.1 0.3
1963 500 566 90 102 9232 10460 5726 6489 54 1.6
1964 490 535 160 175 10730 11720 7134 7792 4.6 2.2
1965 440 467 100 106 11030 11700 7958 6440 4.0 1.3
1966 600 620 11030 11390 7466 7711 5.4
1987 925 025 10 10 13270 13270 10190 10190 7.0 0.1
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (yearly publications)
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Table 2.
Total Active Duty Military Manpower
(Thousands)
(Including Spain)













Rank 71 vs 88
Belgiua 106.8 1 .6% 1 .7% 12 110.0 1 .8% 1 .9% 10 +3
Canada 86.9 1 .3% 1 .4% 13 87.6 1 .4% 1 .5% 13 +0
Denaark 44.5 0.7% 0.7% 14 29.8 0.5% 0.5% 15 -32
France 568.3 8.6% 8.9% 3 557.9 9.1% 9.5% 3 -2
Germany 472.0 7.1% 7.4% 5 495.0 8.1% 8.4% 4 +4
Greece 178.7 2.7% 2.8% 10 199.3 3.2% 3.4% 9 + 11
Italy 526.0 8.0% 8.3% 4 446.2 7.3% 7.6% 5 -15
Luxembourg 1 .1 0.0% 0.0% 16 1.3 0.0% 0.0% 16 +19
Netherlands 113.0 1 .7% 1 .8% 11 106.7 1.7% 1 .8% 11 -5
Norway 36.3 0.5% 0.6% 15 40.2 0.7% 0.7% 14 +10
Portugal 244.2 3.7% 3.8% 8 103.7 1 .7% 1 .8% 12 -57
Spain 282.2 4.3% 4.4% 7 303.9 4.9% 5.2% 7 +7
Turkey 614.5 9.3% 9.6% 2 847.1 13.8% 14.4% 2 +37
UK 384.0 5.8% 6.0% 6 323.7 5.3% 5.5% 6 -15
US 2714.0 41 .4% 42.6% 1 2246.0 36.5% 38.1% 1 -17
Japan 234.3 3.5% 9 247.2 4.0% 8 +5













1981 45.8 4.7 963 37.6 14.2
1982 46.8 4.3 997 32.7 15.0
1983 47.8 4.1 1010 30.5 16.1
1984 48.3 5.9 1035 50.3 16.5
1985 49.3 5.1 1080 45.0 16.5
1986 50.3 8.1 1159 34.8 15.5
1987 51.4 7.4 1325 38.9 15.2
1988 52.4 3.4 1342 75.4 14.0
Source: The Middle East Review, 1981-1989
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